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MUST SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS LAND USE 
CLAIMS BE SO “EXHAUST”ING? 
Nader James Khorassani* 
 
When is a land use dispute a federal case?  Although some perceive 
challenges to zoning and land use laws as local issues ripe for local 
resolution, some fights over land use pose constitutional questions suitable 
for federal adjudication.  Indeed, many zoning disputes implicate 
substantive due process, a federally protected constitutional guarantee.  A 
circuit split has developed regarding when plaintiffs may assert substantive 
due process claims in federal court.  While the First and Seventh Circuits 
only hear such cases when the plaintiff has first brought her substantive due 
process claim in state court, the Second, Third, Ninth, and Eleventh 
Circuits impose no such requirement.  This Note argues that the First and 
Seventh Circuits’ state court litigation precondition is erroneous because 
this requirement is both unnecessary and inefficient. 
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In October 2011, the Fairfax County, Virginia zoning board ordered 
Mark Grapin, a veteran of the Iraq War, to demolish a tree house he built in 
his yard.1  Unbeknownst to Grapin, the tree house—located on his front 
yard—contravened county zoning codes, and required a variance to be 
constructed.2  Because he spent over $3,000 on materials and permits to 
build the tree house (and, perhaps more importantly, because he promised 
the tree house to his two young boys), Grapin appealed the zoning board’s 
decision.3  Ultimately, Grapin was victorious, and after receiving a petition 
 
 1. Brianne Carter, Falls Church Tree House Fight Goes to Fairfax County Zoning 
Board, WJLA.COM (Nov. 29, 2011, 10:18 AM), http://www.wjla.com/articles/2011/11/falls-
church-tree-house-fight-goes-to-fairfax-county-zoning-board-69701.html. 
 2. Todd Starnes, Dad Fights Zoning Board’s Order to Destroy Backyard Tree House, 
FOXNEWS.COM (Oct. 17, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011/10/17/dad-fights-zoning-
boards-order-to-destroy-backyard-tree-house/. 
 3. Id. 
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with 1,500 signatures in favor of the tree house, the zoning board granted 
Grapin the necessary variance, preserving his children’s leafy retreat.4 
The zoning code that Grapin inadvertently violated is an example of a 
land use regulation.5  Local governments can regulate the use of land within 
their domain as part of their inherent police power.6  Indeed, U.S. 
municipalities have imposed land use restrictions since the colonial era.7  
As the country grew and developed over the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, local governments increasingly exercised their power to regulate 
land use in furtherance of public welfare objectives like health, safety, and 
environmental conservation.8  Zoning laws regulating property use are now 
common across the country.9  It was fortunate that the Fairfax County 
zoning board granted Grapin’s variance request, as courts rarely invalidate 
zoning regulations.10 
In spite of the presumption in its favor, however, the government’s 
regulatory ability is not infinite and is subject to a number of limits imposed 
by the U.S. Constitution.11  Accordingly, landowners can use the courts to 
challenge regulations that unconstitutionally exceed the government’s 
police power.  Indeed, these claims often give rise to heated clashes 
between local governments and their constituents.12  Many land use 
disputes are framed as substantive due process (SDP) claims and allege that 
the regulations are invalid exercises of a state’s police power, based on the 
theory that the regulations are unrelated to any legitimate governmental 
objective13 and are thus unconstitutional.14 
 
 4. Falls Church Tree House Can Stay with Conditions, Zoning Board Says, WJLA.COM 
(Nov. 30, 2011, 11:17 AM), http://www.wjla.com/articles/2011/11/falls-chuch-tree-house-
can-stay-with-conditions-zoning-board-says-69759.html. 
 5. See infra Part I.A. 
 6. 1 EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, JR., RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 1:2 
(4th ed. 2012) (power to regulate land use is inherent in a sovereign state). 
 7. See, e.g., John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern 
Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1259–81 (1996) (describing land use ordinances 
imposed by colonial governments). 
 8. See 1 ZIEGLER, supra note 6, § 1:2 (describing the increased regulation of land use in 
furtherance of public goals). 
 9. See id. § 1:3 (zoning regulations adopted in a large majority of the municipalities 
across the country). 
 10. BRIAN W. BLAESSER ET AL., LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION § 4.03 (Brian W. 
Blaesser & Alan C. Weinstein eds., 1989) (land use regulations presumed constitutional); see 
infra notes 36–40 and accompanying text. 
 11. See 1 ZIEGLER, supra note 6, § 2:2 (zoning regulations must not violate 
constitutional limitations). 
 12. E.g., Patrick Cassidy, Sound Wind Farm Dispute Nears Climax, CAPE COD TIMES 
(Jan. 12, 2010), http://www.capecodonline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100112/
NEWS/1120305 (detailing dispute between nearly one dozen Cape Cod towns, five Indian 
tribes, and the federal government, over the proposed construction of 130 wind turbines in 
Nantucket Sound); Tim Gannon, Riverhead ZBA to Rule on Fate of S. Jamesport House,  
SUFFOLK TIMES (Sept. 16, 2011, 3:39 AM), http://suffolktimes.timesreview.com/2011/09/
19858/riverhead-zba-to-rule-on-fate-of-s-jamesport-house/ (discussing a dispute over zoning 
regulations prohibiting the plaintiff from constructing his home). 
 13. See infra Part I.C for a full discussion of SDP claims. 
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Choosing a venue for SDP challenges can, however, be a tricky decision.  
When deciding between state and federal courts, SDP plaintiffs may often 
pursue a federal claim as authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1983,15 due to 
allegations of constitutional injury.16  Nonetheless, land use claims must 
satisfy additional requirements before federal courts can adjudicate them.17  
Because land use claims often suffer from jurisdictional defects,18 federal 
courts use ripeness to ensure that only claims which are ready—that is, 
ripe—to be decided, are.19 
Despite the myriad land use disputes brought in federal court,20 the U.S. 
Supreme Court has enunciated a clear ripeness standard for only one type:  
the regulatory takings claim.21  Regulatory takings claims allege that the 
government unlawfully “took” private property by enacting strict land use 
restrictions, thereby triggering a Fifth Amendment duty to provide the 
landowner with just compensation.22  The Supreme Court has decreed two 
preconditions that plaintiffs must meet before such claims ripen.  First, 
plaintiffs must obtain a final decision regarding the application of the 
regulations to their land.  Second, they must pursue just compensation in 
state court.23  These two requirements are respectively known as finality24 
and exhaustion.25  Unless plaintiffs satisfy both requirements, their takings 
claims are unripe, and federal courts will not resolve them.26 
Although these ripeness requirements developed in the context of 
regulatory takings, federal courts have applied them to other land use 
disputes.27  This Note focuses specifically on these ripeness requirements’ 
applicability to SDP claims.  Unlike the ripeness standard for regulatory 
takings, the standard applicable to SDP claims has not been given uniform 
effect throughout the circuits.  Indeed, the First and Seventh Circuits require 
both finality and exhaustion,28 while the Second, Third, Ninth, and 
Eleventh Circuits require only finality.29 
 
 14. This Note will frequently use the term SDP.  While SDP claims can take many 
forms, when used in this Note, the term will refer exclusively to SDP claims alleging that 
land use regulations are arbitrary or irrational. 
 15. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
 16. See MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION CLAIMS & DEFENSES § 1.01 
(4th ed. 2003) (noting that § 1983 provides a cause of action for violations of federal rights). 
 17. For a full discussion of the ripeness of select land use claims, see infra Parts II.C, III. 
 18. See infra Part II.C. 
 19. For a full discussion of ripeness’s aims, see infra Part II.B. 
 20. See infra Part I.B–D. 
 21. See infra Part II.C.1–2. 
 22. 2 PATRICIA E. SALKIN, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 16:1 (5th ed. 2012) (explaining 
how takings of property require just compensation pursuant to the Fifth Amendment). 
 23. For an in-depth discussion of these ripeness requirements, see infra Part II.C.2. 
 24. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 25. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 26. See 2 SALKIN, supra note 22, § 16:12 (indicating that to be heard by a court, takings 
must be “ripe for review”); see also infra Part. II.C. 
 27. E.g., Forseth v. Vill. of Sussex, 199 F.3d 363, 370 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that SDP 
claims are subject to both finality and exhaustion); see also infra Part III. 
 28. See infra Part III.C. 
 29. See infra Part III.B. 
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The application of finality to SDP claims is logical.30  Without a final 
application of regulations to the property, one cannot know how the 
regulations will affect the property owner, and thus it is unclear whether 
any injury has been sustained.31  However, the relevance of two 
questions—whether a litigant has been denied just compensation, and in 
turn, whether a litigant must have pursued her claim in state court before 
bringing an SDP claim in federal court—remain debatable.32 
This Note argues that exhaustion is unnecessary for SDP claims.  
Focusing on the aims of exhaustion and its resulting practical and legal 
effects, this Note concludes that it is not only pointless to require SDP 
plaintiffs to sue in state court before federal court, but also inefficient.  
Once plaintiffs satisfy finality, SDP claims do not benefit from state court 
litigation as there is no subsequent change in the facts underlying the 
dispute, even if such litigation is completed.  Instead, due to the 
constitutional nature of the potential injuries sustained, federal courts have 
jurisdiction over SDP claims once litigants satisfy finality.33 
This Note proceeds in four parts.  Part I provides a background of SDP 
claims, distinguishing them from select counterpart land use disputes, most 
importantly, takings and due process takings claims.  Part II then discusses 
ripeness in general, the doctrinal foundations that ground its application to 
land use claims, and the ripeness standard that federal courts apply to 
regulatory takings.  Next, Part III details the circuit split over SDP ripeness, 
contrasting the circuits applying only finality with those applying both 
finality and exhaustion.  Last, in Part IV, this Note criticizes the application 
of exhaustion to SDP claims, ultimately concluding that its application is 
both unnecessary and wasteful. 
I.  CHALLENGING THE VALIDITY OF LAND USE LAWS:  LAND USE 
REGULATIONS, SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS, AND TAKINGS 
This Part provides a background of SDP challenges to land use 
regulations.  It begins with a discussion of the government’s power to 
regulate land use, followed by an explanation of SDP challenges to this 
regulatory power.  Finally, it distinguishes SDP claims from other 
commonly asserted land use disputes, including regulatory takings, due 
process takings, and private takings. 
A.  Governmental Power to Regulate Land Use 
State governments’ police power enables them to regulate land use.34  
Most state legislatures view land use as a primarily local concern and 
delegate their regulatory power to local governments.35  In the same spirit, 
 
 30. See infra Part III.A for a full discussion of finality’s application to SDP claims. 
 31. See infra notes 217–19 and accompanying text. 
 32. See infra Parts III.B, IV. 
 33. See infra Parts III.B, IV.A. 
 34. 1 SALKIN, supra note 22, § 2:1 (“[Z]oning restrictions are enacted pursuant to the 
police power of the state.”). 
 35. Id. (noting that most states delegate the zoning power to political subdivisions). 
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courts generally defer to local zoning regulations and liberally construe 
valid police power objectives when scrutinizing land use restrictions.36  As 
a result, all regulations that reasonably serve “public health, safety, morals, 
or general welfare” are valid exercises of the police power, and will be 
upheld in court.37  Legitimate land use regulations can vary from the 
extremely complex, like limiting the manner in which industrial mining 
may be done,38 to the more mundane, like prohibiting the construction of a 
swing set in one’s backyard.39  Regardless of complexity, courts rarely find 
that regulations exceed the scope of a state’s police power and will defer to 
local legislatures’ judgment of what land use laws are appropriate to 
achieve local goals.40 
While governmental power to regulate land use is broad, it is not 
infinite.41  On the contrary, it is subject to a number of potent limitations, 
many of which derive from the Constitution.42  When land use regulations 
exceed these constitutional boundaries, courts may invalidate them.43 
B.  Limits on the Zoning and Planning Powers of Local Governments 
Despite the broad deference given to land use regulations, the 
Constitution limits the states’ regulatory abilities.44  These limits, deriving 
from the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, enable litigants to challenge 
land use regulations, and allow courts to invalidate those that violate 
constitutional rights.45  While there are numerous constitutional limits 
protecting distinct constitutional guarantees,46 this Note focuses on those 
 
 36. Id. § 7:3 (“The requirement of a police power objective . . . should be liberally 
construed.”); e.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187–88 (1928) (indicating 
that courts do not invalidate land use determinations unless they are clearly arbitrary or 
irrational). 
 37. 1 SALKIN, supra note 22, § 7:3. 
 38. E.g., Dock Watch Hollow Quarry Pit, Inc. v. Twp. of Warren, 361 A.2d 12, 16–18 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976), aff’d, 377 A.2d 1201 (N.J. 1977) (describing limitations on 
mining). 
 39. Paul Schott, Non-Complying Swing Set Not Child’s Play for Westport Zoning 
Officials, CONN. POST (Apr. 23, 2011, 1:55 PM), http://www.ctpost.com/local/article/Non-
complying-swing-set-not-child-s-play-for-1349734.php. 
 40. BLAESSER ET AL., supra note 10, § 4.03 (noting that courts “rarely hold that a land use 
regulation violates substantive due process”); 1 ZIEGLER, supra note 6, § 1:2 (discussing how 
federal courts have adopted a “broad and expansive” view of the police power); see Vill. of 
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386–87 (1926) (suggesting that societal 
development requires imposition of land use controls). 
 41. 1 SALKIN, supra note 22, § 6:1 (power to regulate land use is limited). 
 42. Id. § 2:26 (courts will not uphold unconstitutional regulations). 
 43. Id. (indicating that courts may invalidate regulations as a whole, or as applied to a 
single parcel). 
 44. JULIAN C. JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND 
DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW § 3.5 (2d ed. 2007) (explaining that federal and state 
constitutions limit municipalities’ regulatory ability). 
 45. 1 ZIEGLER, supra note 6, § 1:2 (detailing how the due process and takings clauses 
provide causes of action to litigants challenging zoning regulations). 
 46. See generally JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 44, § 10.13–.15 (describing 
procedural due process, equal protection, and First Amendment rights limiting land use 
regulations). 
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deriving from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution, specifically, SDP.47 
C.  Substantive Due Process 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that 
no one shall be deprived of “life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law.”48  Due process prohibits arbitrary or unreasonable legislation,49 
including arbitrary or unreasonable land use regulations.50  As a result, 
landowners can challenge the validity of land use laws, and courts may 
strike down those that are “not reasonably related to promoting some 
legitimate public purpose.”51  In effect, these SDP claims allege that the 
state has exceeded its police powers by enacting regulations that fail to 
serve a legitimate objective.52  SDP claims are the most commonly used 
basis for challenging land use regulations.53  Section 1983, which provides 
a civil remedy against state actors for the deprivation of federal rights—
including constitutional guarantees54—is an oft-used mechanism for 
bringing SDP challenges.55 
The Supreme Court first applied the SDP requirement that land use 
regulations must further a legitimate governmental purpose when it upheld 
a municipality’s zoning scheme in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.56  
In that case, the village enacted a comprehensive zoning plan, dividing the 
municipality into different districts where specific land uses were 
proscribed or prescribed.57  The landowner’s parcel was residentially zoned, 
 
 47. The Fourteenth Amendment also guarantees procedural due process.  See id. § 10.13.  
As these claims present an entirely different legal question than SDP, id. (noting that 
procedural due process concerns how a deprivation of process came about, not why), their 
ripeness requirements are not relevant to this Note. 
 48. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 49. 2 SALKIN, supra note 22, § 15:2 (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment “acts to 
prohibit arbitrary and unreasonable government actions”). 
 50. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 44, § 10.12 (“Supreme Court recognizes 
the right to be free from arbitrary or irrational [land use regulations].”); 1 E. C. YOKLEY, 
ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 3-13 (4th ed. 2008) (“Substantive due process demands that 
zoning regulations . . . be reasonably exercised.”). 
 51. BLAESSER ET AL., supra note 10, § 4.03 (explaining that SDP requires regulations to 
further legitimate interests); 1 ZIEGLER, supra note 6, § 3:2. 
 52. See 2 SALKIN, supra note 22, § 15:2 (“The essence of a claim that a zoning 
ordinance or land use regulation violates substantive due process is that it is unreasonable 
and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.”). 
 53. 1 ZIEGLER, supra note 6, § 3:2 (noting that SDP claims are the “most frequently and 
successfully used ground for challenging the constitutionality of zoning restrictions”). 
 54. 5 SALKIN, supra note 22, § 46:1 (describing § 1983). 
 55. Id. (explaining how § 1983 allows litigants to bring SDP challenges); 4 ZIEGLER, 
supra note 6, § 66:25 (“[Section] 1983 creates a federal remedy that is available for certain 
violations of federal constitutional or statutory law in land use cases.”); see J. David 
Breemer, Ripeness Madness:  The Expansion of Williamson County’s Baseless “State 
Procedures” Takings Ripeness Requirement to Non-Takings Claims, 41 URB. LAW. 615, 634 
(2009) (noting that § 1983’s purpose is to allow federal courts to protect against 
unconstitutional state action). 
 56. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
 57. Id. at 379–83 (detailing zoning regulations). 
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impeding it from using it industrially.58  In an effort to commercially 
exploit its property, the landowner attempted to invalidate the zoning 
regulations as violative of SDP.59  The Court affirmed the zoning laws, 
however, finding “sufficiently cogent” justifications for their enactment.60  
The village’s zoning plan furthered a number of legitimate public interests, 
including ensuring fire departments could access all properties, decreasing 
traffic accidents, and improving the overall quality of life for residents.61  
Noting the importance of context in SDP claims,62 the Court added that 
challenges alleging the facial invalidity of regulations would not be heavily 
scrutinized, and therefore required only minimal justification to prove their 
constitutionality.63  As such, the comprehensive zoning regulations in 
Euclid were, on their face, constitutional.64 
Euclid’s holding reveals two important aspects of SDP claims.  First, it 
demonstrates that whether a regulation violates SDP is a fact-intensive 
inquiry, and courts will consider a variety of factors in assessing each 
claim.65  Ultimately, however, a regulation will be upheld if it is 
“reasonably calculated” to achieve the stated governmental objective.66  
Federal courts thus engage in what is known as “rational basis review” 
when scrutinizing land use regulations for SDP validity, upholding 
regulations that can conceivably be related to some legitimate public 
purpose.67  This strong deference to zoning regulations is due, in part, to 
federal courts’ desire to keep their dockets clear of local zoning disputes.68 
Second, Euclid distinguishes between facial and as-applied SDP claims, a 
distinction still recognized today.69  In asserting a facial SDP claim, 
landowners challenge property regulations on their face, before they are 
 
 58. Id. at 384 (land was residentially zoned). 
 59. See id. (noting that the complaint alleged that the zoning plan amounted to a 
deprivation of Fourteenth Amendment due process rights). 
 60. Id. at 395 (noting regulations were not “clearly arbitrary and unreasonable”). 
 61. Id. at 394 (listing purposes furthered by the comprehensive zoning plan). 
 62. Id. at 387–88 (explaining that a valid use of police power varies with the 
circumstances). 
 63. Id. at 395 (noting that the Court will not heavily scrutinize “sentence by sentence” 
zoning provisions not yet applied to the property). 
 64. Id. at 397 (“[T]he ordinance in its general scope and dominant features . . . is a valid 
exercise of authority.”). 
 65. See, e.g., 2 SALKIN, supra note 22, § 15:11 (indicating that whether a regulation is 
arbitrary or unreasonable is “highly fact specific”). 
 66. 1 ZIEGLER, supra note 6, § 3:17. 
 67. 2 SALKIN, supra note 22, § 15:3 (explaining how federal courts presume that land 
use regulations are constitutional); 1 ZIEGLER, supra note 6, § 3:17 (suggesting that 
regulations are valid when a conceivable link to a public objective exists); see also Russell 
W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Substantive Due Process Analysis, 26 U.S.F. L. REV. 625, 644 
(1992) (noting that exercises of police power, including land use regulations, are valid if 
“one can hypothesize” a legitimate interest that the government “might have been attempting 
to further”). 
 68. See 1 ZIEGLER, supra note 6, § 3:3 (stating that the rational basis test reflects a 
“docket clearing method of avoiding local zoning cases”). 
 69. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395 (distinguishing between challenges to regulations already 
applied to one’s property and those launched by the “mere existence” of the ordinance). 
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even applied to their land.70  Facial claims thus assert that the regulations 
cannot further a legitimate governmental interest under any set of 
circumstances.71  In contrast to facial challenges, as-applied challenges 
concern only the alleged unconstitutional application of regulations to one’s 
property, not the regulations themselves.72  As-applied SDP claims concern 
regulations that have already affected a landowner’s property,73 and allege 
that only such application violates their SDP rights.74  Because SDP 
protects against arbitrary governmental conduct,75 however, land use 
regulations that fail to advance legitimate government interests, either in 
theory or in practice, violate SDP.76 
D.  Substantive Due Process Claims Distinguished from Takings 
Commonly asserted alongside SDP claims are takings challenges, which 
are founded upon different legal theories and seek different remedies.77  
While this Note primarily focuses on SDP claims, it is necessary to 
distinguish them from takings, as the two are often confused.78 
 
 70. See Stephen E. Abraham, Williamson County Fifteen Years Later:  When is a 
Takings Claim (Ever) Ripe?, 36 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 101, 107 (2001) (explaining that 
facial challenges arise “from mere enactment of the regulation”). 
 71. 2 SALKIN, supra note 22, § 15:11 (“When a litigant brings a facial challenge, she 
must show that the regulation is unreasonable in all of its applications.”); see, e.g., Cnty. 
Concrete Corp. v. Twp. of Roxbury, 442 F.3d 159, 164 (3d Cir. 2006); Smithfield 
Concerned Citizens for Fair Zoning v. Town of Smithfield, 907 F.2d 239, 244 (1st Cir. 1990) 
(holding that a land use regulation does not facially violate due process if “a rational 
relationship exists between it and a legitimate governmental objective”). 
 72. 2 SALKIN, supra note 22, § 15:11 (“[I]n an as applied challenge, [a litigant] must 
show only that it is unconstitutional as applied to her property.”); e.g., WMX Techs., Inc. v. 
Gasconade Cnty., 105 F.3d 1195, 1198 n.1  (8th Cir. 1997) (noting that as-applied challenges 
attack “only the decision that applied the ordinance to [one’s] property, not the ordinance in 
general”); Eide v. Sarasota Cnty., 908 F.2d 716, 722 (11th Cir. 1990) (discussing facial and 
as-applied challenges). 
 73. See 2 SALKIN, supra note 22, § 15:11 (explaining that as-applied claims involve 
unconstitutional applications of regulations to one’s property). 
 74. David S. Mendel, Note, Determining Ripeness of Substantive Due Process Claims 
Brought by Landowners Against Local Governments, 95 MICH. L. REV. 492, 492 (1996) 
(“Landowners who sustain economic harm from arbitrary and capricious applications of land 
use regulations may sue the local government entities responsible for applying those 
regulations . . . alleging that the local government entities deprived them of substantive due 
process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 75. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 76. E.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005)  (“[A] regulation that 
fails to serve any legitimate governmental objective may be so arbitrary or irrational that it 
runs afoul of the Due Process Clause.”); Cnty. Concrete, 442 F.3d at 169 (explaining that 
successful facial challenges “allege facts that would support a finding of arbitrary or 
irrational legislative action” (quoting Pace Res., Inc. v. Shrewsbury Twp., 808 F.2d 1023, 
1035 (3d Cir. 1987))). 
 77. See, e.g., Crown Point Dev., Inc. v. City of Sun Valley, 506 F.3d 851, 855 (9th Cir. 
2007) (explaining the distinction between takings and SDP claims). 
 78. See, e.g., JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 44, § 10.12 (“The relationship 
between substantive due process and regulatory takings has been confusing.”). Indeed, 
distinction between these claims is critical for ripeness purposes. Compare infra notes 264–
68, with infra Part III.C. 
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1.  Takings 
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the government 
from taking private property “for public use, without just compensation.”79  
Applicable against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,80 the 
Takings Clause places a limit on the power of local governments to regulate 
land use by compelling them to compensate landowners for regulations that 
excessively restrict the use of private property.81  In effect, this limit is two-
pronged.  First, it prevents governments from taking land, under any 
circumstances, unless the taking furthers a legitimate public purpose.82  
Second, it requires governments to compensate landowners when a taking 
occurs.83 
Governments may affect a taking in at least two ways:  physical or 
regulatory takings.84  Physical takings occur when the government actually 
occupies or condemns land or property.85  This physical invasion of a 
property interest imposes upon the government a “categorical duty to 
compensate” the landowner,86 no matter how minimal the infringement 
may be.87  Second, the government may take property by affecting a 
regulatory taking.  Regulatory takings occur following the enactment of 
governmental regulations that place “such a burdensome restriction on a 
landowner’s use of his property that the government has for all intents and 
 
 79. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 80. Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City of Chi., 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897) (holding 
that due process requires compensation for takings); 1 ZIEGLER, supra note 6, § 6:2 
(explaining that the Fifth Amendment is applicable to local governments through the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
 81. 2 SALKIN, supra note 22, § 16:1 (noting that excessive land use restrictions may 
require just compensation to the landowner). 
 82. Id. § 17:1 (explaining that Fifth Amendment authorizes only takings for a public 
purpose); e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005) (holding that takings 
are valid when purpose is future public use); Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 
241 (1984) (holding that takings are valid when they are “rationally related to a conceivable 
public purpose”); cf. Montgomery v. Carter Cnty., 226 F.3d 758, 766 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting 
that takings for a private purpose “are unconstitutional regardless of whether just 
compensation is paid”). 
 83. 2 SALKIN, supra note 22, § 17:1 (explaining that valid takings must be fairly 
compensated); e.g., Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 
172, 194 (1985) (stating that the Fifth Amendment “proscribes taking without just 
compensation”). 
 84. See 1 ZIEGLER, supra note 6, § 6:1 (noting different types of takings). 
 85. 2 SALKIN, supra note 22, § 16:6 (describing physical invasions of property as per se 
takings); e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) (“The paradigmatic 
taking requiring just compensation is a direct government appropriation or physical invasion 
of private property.”); Asociación de Subscripción Conjunta del Seguro de Responsabilidad 
Obligatorio v. Flores Galarza, 484 F.3d 1, 28 (1st Cir. 2007) (“A physical taking occurs 
either when there is a condemnation or a physical appropriation of property.”). 
 86. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322 
(2002); see Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today:  A Primer for the Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 307, 320 (2007) (noting that physical occupations of space are “per se” takings). 
 87. E.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 438 (1982) 
(holding that the installation of cable T.V. equipment, limited to “plates, boxes, wires, bolts, 
and screws” on the roof and side of an apartment building amounted to a physical taking 
requiring compensation). 
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purposes ‘taken’ the landowner’s property.”88  Not all property use 
restrictions amount to a regulatory taking, however, and there is no set 
“test” for courts to determine whether regulations excessively burden 
property and amount to a regulatory taking.89  In this context, the line 
between SDP and takings can become hazy. 
a.  Takings Mistaken for Substantive Due Process 
The confusion between SDP and takings claims is due in large part to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Agins v. City of Tiburon,90 which made the 
deprivation of property resulting from regulations that failed to substantially 
advance a legitimate state interest actionable as a taking.91  While such 
regulations would purportedly be invalid exercises of the police power, and 
presumably violative of SDP,92 Agins empowered litigants to challenge 
them as takings.  After Agins, therefore, takings and SDP analyses became 
entangled.93 
In light of the confusion between takings and SDP claims, some federal 
courts began to hold that the Takings Clause preempted SDP claims.94  
Such courts relied on Graham v. Connor,95 which held that SDP should not 
be used in situations where another constitutional amendment affords more 
explicit protections.96  For example, in extending this logic to land use 
claims, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Takings Clause “was 
sufficiently express” in its restrictions on governmental interference with 
property rights to preempt the use of SDP in land use disputes.97 
While the Ninth Circuit consolidated SDP and takings claims, other 
courts did not.  In John Corp. v. City of Houston,98 the Fifth Circuit 
 
 88. Mark S. Dennison & Steven M. Silverberg, Zoning:  Proof of Inverse Condemnation 
from Excessive Land Use Regulation § 2, in 31 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts 563 (1995); see 
also Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (holding that a regulation that “goes 
too far” is recognized as a taking). 
 89. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322–32 (noting that whether a regulatory taking 
occurs is a “fact specific inquiry”); 2 SALKIN, supra note 22, § 16:1 (describing different 
regulatory taking “tests”). 
 90. 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
 91. See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 44, § 10.12 (explaining that Agins 
caused confusion between regulatory takings and SDP by injecting the substantially advance 
test into takings analysis). 
 92. See supra notes 37, 49, 51 and accompanying text (noting that SDP is violated by 
regulations that further no legitimate purpose). 
 93. See Nisha Ramachandran, Realizing Judicial Substantive Due Process in Land Use 
Claims:  The Role of Land Use Statutory Schemes, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 381, 387 (2009) 
(explaining that SDP language and reasoning “seeped into takings doctrine through Agins”). 
 94. E.g., Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc) 
(discussing preemption of SDP rights by the takings clause). 
 95. 490 U.S. 386 (1989). 
 96. See Mark Fenster, The Stubborn Incoherence of Regulatory Takings, 28 STAN. 
ENVTL. L.J. 525, 538 (2009) (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s reliance on Graham’s explicit 
constitutional provision language). 
 97. Robert H. Thomas, The Ninth Circuit Rediscovers Substantive Due Process in Land 
Use Cases, 31 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP., no. 11, 2008, at 1, 4; see Ramachandran, supra note 
93, at 390 (noting Armendariz’s holding that the Takings Clause preempted SDP claims). 
 98. 214 F.3d 573 (5th Cir. 2000). 
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explicitly declined to analyze SDP claims as takings.99  The court noted that 
SDP claims often assert a violation of rights “not protected by the Takings 
Clause,” and that “a careful analysis must be undertaken to assess the extent 
to which a plaintiff’s substantive due process claim rests on protections that 
are also afforded by the Takings Clause.”100  As such, because the plaintiff 
alleged that the regulations were unconstitutionally vague—which would 
violate SDP101—its SDP claim was separately cognizable from its takings 
claim and worthy of a distinct analysis.102  Indeed, other circuits 
distinguished between SDP and takings claims, causing a circuit split to 
develop.103 
b.  Lingle:  Separation of Takings and Substantive Due Process 
In 2005, however, the Supreme Court settled the score between the 
circuits, distinguishing SDP from takings in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. 
Inc.104  In Lingle, the Court held that whether regulations furthered 
legitimate governmental purposes was an “inquiry in the nature of a due 
process, not a takings” analysis, and thus was irrelevant to whether a taking 
had occurred.105  Detangling the two theories, the Court clarified that a 
takings analysis “presupposes that the government has acted in pursuit of a 
valid public purpose,”106 and concerns instead the “magnitude, character 
and distribution of a governmental action’s impact on private property 
rights.”107  Regulations that fail to promote a legitimate purpose, on the 
other hand, are invalid with or without compensation, rendering irrelevant 
the Takings Clause’s just compensation requirement.108 
In distinguishing between the different analytical frameworks relevant to 
takings and SDP analyses, the Court mandated that SDP and takings claims 
be analyzed separately.109  For example, in Lingle, Chevron asserted a 
 
 99. See id. at 583 (“[A] blanket rule that . . . the Takings Clause subsumes any 
substantive due process claim relating to a deprivation of property is both inconsistent with 
our precedents and with the approach taken by a majority of other circuit courts.”). 
 100. Id. 
 101. See id. at 585 (indicating that the complaint alleged that the ordinance was 
unconstitutionally vague). 
 102. See id. (recognizing plaintiff’s takings and SDP claims). 
 103. See, e.g., Lindquist v. Buckingham Twp., 68 F. App’x 288, 289–90 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(analyzing SDP and takings claims separately); Gavlak v. Town of Somers, 267 F. Supp. 2d 
214, 220 (D. Conn. 2003) (noting distinction between takings and SDP claims); see Fenster, 
supra note 96, at 539 (discussing various circuits’ rejection of the Ninth Circuit’s approach). 
 104. 544 U.S. 528 (2005). 
 105. Id. at 540. 
 106. Id. at 543. 
 107. 2 SALKIN, supra note 22, § 16.4. 
 108. See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 44, § 10.12 (“If a law fails to promote a 
legitimate end, it is invalid and it makes no sense to proceed to discuss whether 
compensation is due under the Fifth Amendment.”). 
 109. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 544 (holding that allegations of arbitrary and irrational 
regulations do not state a claim under the Takings Clause); Fenster, supra note 96, at 540 
(“Lingle explicitly held that takings claims and substantive due process claims were 
doctrinally and analytically distinct.”). 
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takings claim,110 challenging a Hawaii land use statute, Act 257,111  which 
placed rent caps on leases between oil companies and independent gas 
station operators.112  Hawaii argued that this rent cap would benefit 
consumers by keeping gasoline prices low, and thus did not affect a taking, 
as it substantially advanced a legitimate interest.113  Although the district 
and circuit courts accepted as legitimate Hawaii’s interest in regulating gas 
prices through the rent cap, they nevertheless both found that a taking 
occurred because Act 257 would not have any effect on gas prices, and thus 
failed to substantially advance Hawaii’s purported interests.114  The 
Supreme Court reversed, noting that Chevron’s claim alleging Act 257 was 
“fundamentally arbitrary and irrational” for failing to have any effect on 
gasoline prices did “not sound under the Takings Clause,” but it did 
potentially state an SDP claim, as the legitimacy of the regulations 
themselves were called into question, and the underlying effect on 
Chevron’s property value was not at issue.115  Indeed, Lingle directly 
overruled the Ninth Circuit’s merging of SDP and takings.116  Challenges to 
regulations alleging a failure to serve a legitimate interest are thus 
actionable exclusively as SDP claims, not as takings.117 
2.  Due Process Takings 
Another source of confusion between SDP and takings claims arises from 
another claim, called “due process takings,” which allege that land use 
regulations are “unduly onerous,” violating SDP.118  Such cases are hard to 
distinguish from takings, as courts may find that such regulations either “go 
too far,” and as discussed, amount to a regulatory taking,119 or that they are 
unduly onerous and thus violative of SDP.120  Indeed, apart from their 
remedies, due process takings and garden variety regulatory takings claims 
are essentially identical.121  Due process takings are, however, quite 
different from SDP claims:  SDP claims contend that regulations fail to 
serve a legitimate purpose; due process takings, on the other hand, merely 
 
 110. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 533 (noting Chevron asserted a takings claim). 
 111. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 486H-10.4 (2008). 
 112. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 533 (describing Act 257 and its requirements). 
 113. Id. at 534 (noting Hawaii’s argument). 
 114. Id. at 535–36 (noting that oil companies could “unilaterally” raise wholesale oil 
prices, circumventing Act 257’s aim to control gas prices). 
 115. Id. at 544. 
 116. Crown Point Dev., Inc. v. City of Sun Valley, 506 F.3d 851, 855 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(noting that Lingle “pulls the rug out from under [the Ninth Circuit’s] rationale for totally 
precluding substantive due process claims based on arbitrary or unreasonable conduct”). 
 117. See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 44, § 10.12 (stating that a regulation’s 
“failure to advance a legitimate state interest is only actionable under the due process 
clause”). 
 118. Id. (noting that SDP protects against “unduly onerous” laws). 
 119. Id. (explaining that regulatory takings may result from regulations which go “too 
far”); supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 120. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 44, § 10.12 (indicating that regulations may 
be unduly onerous, violating SDP). 
 121. Id. (noting that the due process taking remedy is injunctive relief and damages, while 
the takings remedy is just compensation). 
422 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
contend regulations have “gone too far.”122  As such, in contrast to SDP 
claims, due process takings do not allege regulations are arbitrary or 
irrational.123  Understanding the difference between due process takings and 
SDP claims is essential, as some federal courts distinguish these claims for 
ripeness purposes.124 
3.  Private Takings 
Another claim commonly confused with SDP claims are private takings, 
which allege that the government illegitimately took property to further a 
private, not public, purpose.125  Because the Fifth Amendment requires 
takings to further a valid public purpose, a taking that does not satisfy this 
requirement is unconstitutional, even if just compensation is paid.126  While 
there is some overlap between SDP challenges alleging that land use 
regulations serve no legitimate purpose and private takings claims alleging 
that land has been taken for an illegitimate private purpose, courts often 
distinguish between the two.127  Indeed, many circuits recognize both SDP 
and private takings, analyzing each dispute separately.128  Distinction 
between these two claims is beyond the scope of this Note, however.  
Because all private takings and SDP claims allege that land use regulations 
exceed the police power,129 and because circuits that separately 
 
 122. See Southview Assocs. v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d 84, 96 (2d Cir. 1992) (explaining that 
while due process takings claims are premised on the theory that a regulation has gone too 
far, SDP claims challenge regulations as arbitrary or irrational). 
 123. Id. (noting that the SDP claim alleges arbitrary and capricious governmental action). 
 124. Compare JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 44, § 10.12 (indicating that 
Williamson County’s two-pronged ripeness test applies to “unduly onerous” SDP claims, 
while most circuits apply only the finality test to SDP claims), and infra notes 264–68 and 
accompanying text, with infra Part III.C (discussing how the First and Seventh Circuits 
apply both Williamson County prongs to SDP claims). 
 125. 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 43 (2004) (noting that a state cannot authorize the 
taking of property for private use). 
 126. Id. (“Takings of private property for strictly private uses are unconstitutional 
regardless of whether just compensation is paid.”); see supra note 82 and accompanying 
text. 
 127. E.g., Crown Point Dev., Inc. v. City of Sun Valley, 506 F.3d 851, 856 (9th Cir. 
2007) (discussing how Lingle overruled Ninth Circuit precedent barring any SDP claim 
challenging the validity of regulations); Warren v. City of Athens, 411 F.3d 697, 705–06 
(6th Cir. 2005) (declining to merge SDP and private takings claims); see Jonathan Rohr, 
Note, Assessing the Scope of Williamson County:  Why It Should Be Applied to Private 
Purpose Claims, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1809, 1818–19 (2009) (discussing differing 
approaches to private takings claims). 
 128. E.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005) (explaining how due 
process may be violated because the purpose of a taking “is found to be impermissible—for 
instance because it fails to meet the ‘public use’ requirement or is so arbitrary as to violate 
due process”) (emphasis added); Action Apartment Ass’n v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 
509 F.3d 1020, 1023–26 (9th Cir. 2007) (analyzing SDP and private takings separately); 
Whittaker v. Cnty. of Lawrence, 674 F. Supp. 2d 668, 690–91, 700–01 (W.D. Pa. 2009) 
(same). 
 129. 26 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 125, § 43 (noting that the public use requirement is 
coterminous with the police power). 
2012] MUST LAND USE CLAIMS BE SO “EXHAUST”ING? 423 
acknowledge private takings also allow such claims to proceed under an 
SDP theory,130 they are, for purposes of this Note, the same.131 
With SDP providing landowners with one method to challenge land use 
regulations, it is a relatively simple task to assert a claim questioning the 
validity of property restrictions.  Less simple, however, is choosing a venue 
for these claims.  As discussed in Parts II and III, choosing to assert land 
use claims in state or federal court can be an extremely important decision 
to make, as years of additional litigation could result from the wrong choice 
of venue. 
II.  NOT SO FAST:  FEDERAL COURTS AND RIPENESS OF 
LAND USE DISPUTES 
Part II focuses on landowners’ ability to assert their land use claims in 
federal court.  It begins with a brief introduction to federal jurisdiction, 
followed by a discussion of ripeness generally.  Next, it discusses ripeness 
in land use claims.  Lastly, it details the ripeness standard the Supreme 
Court announced for takings claims in Williamson County Regional 
Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank,132 which informs SDP ripeness. 
A.  Federal Jurisdiction 
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and can only hear claims 
over which Congress or the Constitution grants them authority.133  Provided 
federal courts have jurisdiction over a claim, they can adjudicate it whether 
it is originally filed in federal court or removed from state court.134 
One basis for federal jurisdiction, federal question jurisdiction, occurs 
when a plaintiff’s claim involves a matter of federal law.135  Federal 
question jurisdiction derives from Article III of the Constitution, which 
bestows upon federal courts the ability to decide all “[c]ases, in Law and 
Equity, arising under this Constitution, [and] the Laws of the United 
 
 130. See Action Apartment, 509 F.3d at 1026 (explaining that allegations which fail to 
state private takings do state a claim under SDP theory); Whittaker, 674 F. Supp. 2d at 690–
91, 697–701 (analyzing allegations of a private purpose taking as a private taking and SDP 
violation). 
 131. See Rohr, supra note 127, at 1819 (suggesting that SDP and private takings are 
essentially identical). 
 132. 473 U.S. 172 (1985). 
 133. See 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3522, at 
100 (3d ed. 2008) (indicating federal courts are empowered to hear only cases whose 
jurisdiction derives from the Constitution or Congress); Anthony C. Piccirillo, Note, 
Sisyphus Meets Icarus:  The Jurisdictional and Comity Limits of Post-satisfaction Anti-
foreign-suit Injunctions, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1407, 1421 (2011) (“U.S. federal courts are 
courts of limited jurisdiction and derive their power solely from the U.S. Constitution or 
statute.”). 
 134. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2006); see 16 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL 
PRACTICE § 107.14 (3d ed. 2011) (noting that the removal statute allows defendants to 
remove to federal court cases over which federal courts have jurisdiction). 
 135. See 13D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 133, § 3561, at 162 (explaining that federal 
question jurisdiction concerns “vindication of federal rights”). 
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States.”136  Although “arising under” federal law may falsely imply a 
simple standard for determining jurisdiction,137 for purposes of this Note it 
suffices to say that federal courts may exercise jurisdiction over claims 
authorized by a federal statute.138  Because federal courts exist at least in 
part to provide an unbiased forum for plaintiffs to vindicate federally 
protected rights, resolving federal statute violations in federal court is 
logical.139 
Federal jurisdiction for land use claims, however, is not so simple.  
Because § 1983 authorizes SDP claims,140 federal courts would normally 
have federal question jurisdiction over them.141  Nevertheless, federal 
courts have developed a supplemental requirement—ripeness—as an 
antecedent to their jurisdiction over many claims, including constitutional 
land use claims.142  Consequently, until ripened, federal courts lack 
jurisdiction over land use disputes, and cannot adjudicate them.143 
B.  Ripeness 
Ripeness reflects the jurisdictional limit on federal courts’ ability to hear 
claims.144  To that end, federal courts impose ripeness requirements on 
claims anchored in future events, whose occurrence is uncertain, to ensure 
that jurisdiction exists.145  Indeed, ripeness ensures that courts hear only 
claims that are fit for adjudication and that actually warrant judicial 
intervention.146  Accordingly, two distinct concerns fuel ripeness:  
 
 136. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 137. See, e.g., 13D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 133, § 3564, at 241 (indicating that the 
federal question must be substantial); id. § 3566, at 261 (indicating that the federal question 
must be in the “well-pleaded complaint”). 
 138. See 32A AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 884 (2007) (noting that federal courts have 
original jurisdiction over claims that arise from the violation of federal law).  This usually 
applies, however, only if the statute authorizes a private cause of action.  See id. § 905 
(explaining that claims alleging violations of federal statutes do not arise under federal law 
unless the violated federal statute provides a private cause of action). 
 139. See 13D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 133, § 3561, at 162 (“The Founders clearly 
envisioned that federal question jurisdiction would provide plaintiffs with a sympathetic 
forum for the vindication of federal rights.”). 
 140. See 4 ZIEGLER, supra note 6, § 66:27 (discussing how § 1983 allows landowners to 
seek remedies for deprivation of any constitutional right, including SDP); supra notes 54–55 
and accompanying text. 
 141. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 15, § 1.07 (explaining how federal courts normally have 
federal question jurisdiction over § 1983 claims); supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
 142. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 162 
(1987) (noting that ripeness is used to determine jurisdiction over constitutional claims). 
 143. BRIAN W. BLAESSER & ALAN C. WEINSTEIN, FEDERAL LAND USE LAW AND 
LITIGATION § 12.IV, at 1185 (2011 ed.) (explaining that ripeness determines federal 
jurisdiction over land use claims). 
 144. 15 MOORE ET AL., supra note 134, § 101.70 (noting that ripeness is relevant to 
subject matter jurisdiction). 
 145. Id. (explaining that ripeness is a question of timing, as courts do not adjudicate 
claims until a real dispute exists); e.g., United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., 275 F.3d 168, 
178 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding that ripeness cautions courts against deciding claims contingent 
upon future events). 
 146. See 15 MOORE ET AL., supra note 134, § 101.70. 
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jurisdictional limits on federal courts, and prudential concerns to exercise 
judicial restraint.147 
Article III of the Constitution, which empowers courts to only hear 
“Cases” or “Controversies,” motivates jurisdictional ripeness concerns.148  
Jurisdictional ripeness prevents courts “from becoming entangled in purely 
abstract or theoretical disagreements,” which have yet to concretely affect 
the parties, and are thus not a “case or controversy” over which the courts 
have jurisdiction.149  Ripeness accordingly helps courts avoid rendering 
“decisions absent a genuine need to resolve a real dispute.”150  Courts avoid 
premature adjudication for numerous reasons, such as to avoid encroaching 
on other governmental agencies’ spheres of authority,151 because of the 
prohibition on issuing advisory opinions,152  and because of their inability 
to make a competent decision regarding prematurely filed claims.153 
In addition to these jurisdictional concerns, ripeness also furthers 
prudential, non-constitutionally mandated considerations.154  Prudential 
ripeness requires an additional inquiry into whether the “harm asserted has 
matured sufficiently to warrant judicial intervention.”155  To that end, courts 
consider “the wisdom, rather than the constitutionality” of hearing certain 
disputes.156  Many concerns underlie this determination.157  First, federal 
courts use ripeness to maximize the accuracy and efficiency of judicial 
decision-making by only deciding cases with a well-developed factual 
record.158  Second, federal courts use ripeness to respect other 
 
 147. See id. (explaining that jurisdictional limits and judicial restraint are both ingredients 
of ripeness); 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 133, § 3532.1, at 375 (noting that Article III 
and prudential limitations shape contemporary ripeness analysis). 
 148. U.S. CONST. art. III § 2; 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 133, § 3532.1, at 375 
(“Article III provides the starting point [for ripeness].”). 
 149. 15 MOORE ET AL., supra note 134, § 101.70; e.g., Entm’t Concepts, Inc., III v. 
Maciejewski, 631 F.2d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 1980) (explaining that ripeness is rooted in the 
“case or controversy” requirement). 
 150. 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 133, § 3532.1, at 372; see 15 MOORE ET AL., supra 
note 134, § 101.70 (identifying ripeness’s core goal as helping courts to avoid making 
unnecessary decisions). 
 151. 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 133, § 3532.1, at 394 (“[E]stablishing proper 
relationships between the judiciary and other branches of the federal government lie at the 
core of ripeness policies.”); e.g., Hodgers-Durgin v. De la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1042–43 
(9th Cir. 1999) (noting the federalism principles underlying ripeness). 
 152. 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 133 § 3532.1, at 375–78 (noting that the prohibition 
against advisory opinions fuels jurisdictional ripeness concerns); e.g., United States v. 
Broad. Music, Inc., 275 F.3d 168, 178–79 (2d Cir. 2001) (refusing to issue an advisory 
opinion and dismissing the case as unripe). 
 153. 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 133, § 3532.1, at 375–78 (noting that limits on 
judicial competence motivate jurisdictional ripeness concerns). 
 154. Mendel, supra note 74, at 500 (noting that prudential ripeness is not constitutionally 
mandated). 
 155. 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 133, § 3532.1, at 385 n.22. 
 156. 15 MOORE ET AL., supra note 134, § 101.70; see 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 133, 
§ 3532.1, at 375 (explaining that while Article III “provides the starting point” for ripeness 
inquiries, prudential concerns are also considered). 
 157. See 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 133, § 3532.1, at 372–79. 
 158. E.g., CSG Exploration Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 930 F.2d 1477, 
1486 (10th Cir. 1991) (dismissing as unripe a claim whose factual record was not fully 
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governmental institutions’ rights to settle disputes.159  Third, ripeness helps 
courts avoid deciding cases on constitutional grounds, which is a canon of 
federal adjudication.160  These prudential concerns, however, are 
considered alongside the hardship that deferring judgment would impose on 
the parties.161  If there is a likelihood of hardship to the parties, these 
prudential considerations will yield, and courts will likely adjudicate the 
dispute.162 
C.  Ripeness of Land Use Disputes 
Despite common concerns underlying ripeness, federal courts apply 
varying ripeness standards in different legal contexts,163 tailoring the rigor 
of the ripeness inquiry to the individual claim at hand.164  In turn, federal 
courts have developed unique ripeness requirements for land use 
disputes.165  Indeed, the Supreme Court has announced specific ripeness 
requirements for regulatory takings claims as a result of their increased 
assertion in federal court.166  Because regulatory takings, if asserted too 
early, present unique challenges for federal adjudication,167 clear ripeness 
rules help weed out premature claims.168  As other land use claims, like 
 
developed); see 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 133, § 3532.1, at 374 (indicating that 
prudential ripeness concerns the accuracy and efficiency of judicial decision making). 
 159. 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 133, § 3532.1, at 398 (explaining that deference to 
state institutions fuels prudential ripeness analysis); e.g., supra note 151 and accompanying 
text. 
 160. 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 125 (2009) (discussing how federal courts 
avoid adjudication of federal constitutional claims when alternative grounds for a decision 
exist); e.g., Hastings v. Judicial Conference, 770 F.2d 1093, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 
(dismissing a constitutional challenge to a statute as premature). 
 161. See 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 133, § 3532.7, at 714 (explaining that courts 
must consider “the need for decision and the weight of the reasons for deferring decision” in 
a prudential ripeness inquiry); Mendel, supra note 74, at 501 (discussing how courts balance 
prudential concerns against hardship to the parties). 
 162. 36 C.J.S. Federal Courts § 90 (2004) (“The greater the hardship to the parties of 
withholding court consideration, the more likely a court will be to find ripeness.”); see 13B 
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 133, § 3532.1, at 394–95 (“Judicial action becomes more 
appropriate as the hardship of denying decision increases.”). 
 163. E.g., Nichol, supra note 142, at 166–67 (comparing ripeness standards for takings 
and First Amendment claims). 
 164. E.g., Ienco v. Angarone, 429 F.3d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that a convicted 
felon’s false arrest claim is unripe until the conviction is overturned); Fed. Express Corp. v. 
Mineta, 373 F.3d 112, 120 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding unripe a challenge to the Air 
Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act recoupment procedures until the 
procedure was actually applied); see Nichol, supra note 142, at 161 (explaining that courts 
employ “several distinct processes” to determine the ripeness of claims). 
 165. E.g., Murphy v. New Milford Zoning Comm’n, 402 F.3d 342, 347 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(explaining how land use disputes have specific ripeness requirements); see infra Parts 
II.C.1–2, III. 
 166. See 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 133, § 3532.1.1, at 420 (identifying a special 
category of ripeness that applies to regulatory takings claims); see also BLAESSER & 
WEINSTEIN, supra note 143, § 12.IV, at 1186 (describing how land use ripeness developed in 
response to regulatory takings). 
 167. See infra notes 179–98 and accompanying text. 
 168. Gregory M. Stein, Regulatory Takings and Ripeness in the Federal Courts, 48 
VAND. L. REV. 1, 7 (1995) (explaining that the Supreme Court developed the ripeness 
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SDP claims, are often asserted alongside takings claims, courts sometimes 
muddle the ripeness standard applied to each.169  Nevertheless, as these 
claims involve different legal rights and remedies,170 the relevant ripeness 
inquiries may differ. 
In Williamson County, the Court addressed the ripeness of regulatory 
takings.171  In this seminal case, a developer alleged that a taking occurred 
after land use regulations limited the developer’s ability to develop its 
property.172  The landowner intended to intensely develop and subdivide its 
676-acre parcel to eventually include 736 homes.173  Although the zoning 
commission approved the original plans, subsequent changes to the zoning 
code resulted in the developer’s already initiated construction plans 
becoming non-compliant.174  After the developer submitted a revised 
development plan, the zoning board rejected the developer’s modified 
proposals, as even they failed to comply with the more stringent zoning 
ordinances.175  This rejection prompted the takings claim, which alleged 
that compliance with the Commission’s requirements would severely 
diminish the amount of homes that the developer could construct on its 
parcel, resulting in a net loss of over $1 million.176  In deciding this 
claim,177 the Court announced a two-pronged ripeness standard, which must 
be satisfied before regulatory takings claims are cognizable in federal 
court.178 
1.  Prong One:  Finality 
Williamson County’s first ripeness prong, finality, requires the 
administrative agency charged with implementing land use regulations to 
have “arrived at a final, definitive position regarding how it will apply the 
regulations at issue to the particular land in question.”179  This requires 
landowners to apply for permits to complete construction, to receive a final 
denial or modification of the submitted plan by the appropriate regulatory 
agency, and to subsequently apply for variances from the relevant zoning 
 
doctrine because landowners “commonly initiate litigation” before a regulatory taking is 
complete). 
 169. See 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 133, § 3532.1.1, at 447–48. 
 170. See supra Part I.D (distinguishing takings and SDP claims). 
 171. Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186 
(1985) (noting that the takings claim was unripe). 
 172. See id. at 176–82, 185 (describing zoning laws precluding the developer from 
building). 
 173. Id. at 177 (noting the original construction plans). 
 174. Id. at 180–81 (describing non-compliant aspects of the development proposal). 
 175. Id. at 181 (describing the commission’s denial of a new proposal). 
 176. Id. at 182 (alleging that meeting the commission’s requirements would curtail 
development and cause economic loss). 
 177. The Court did not answer whether the developer stated an SDP or Fifth Amendment 
takings claim, because either way, the claim was unripe. See id. at 199–200. 
 178. See Rohr, supra note 127, at 1809 (explaining how Williamson County imposes a 
two-pronged ripeness standard on takings claims). 
 179. Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 191; see 2 SALKIN, supra note 22, § 16:12 (indicating 
that finality is satisfied when the government agency enforcing the regulations makes a final 
decision regarding the application of the regulations to one’s property). 
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laws.180  Finality is a necessary prerequisite to takings because the crux of a 
regulatory taking—whether regulations have actually deprived property of 
value—cannot be determined until it is clear how regulations affect the 
property in question.181  As such, jurisdictional concerns regarding whether 
there is “an actual, concrete injury” are at the forefront of finality.182 
Prudential concerns unique to the land use context also underscore 
finality.183  For example, to reduce federal decisions on constitutional 
grounds, federal courts require that regulatory agencies’ action be final and 
definitive, such that courts need only decide constitutional challenges to 
zoning decisions, like regulatory takings, if absolutely necessary.184  
Further, seeking to develop case law only when it can be done wisely, 
federal courts limit their takings decisions to the final application of 
regulations to property.185  This ensures that all the facts necessary to 
properly adjudicate the claim are before the court when it renders its 
decision.186 
Williamson County demonstrates finality in action.  There, the developer 
failed to secure a final decision regarding the applicability of the zoning 
laws to his parcel.187  Although the county denied the developer’s original 
and revised proposals, the developer failed to seek any variances from the 
zoning laws, which could have allowed its original development proposal to 
proceed.188  Indeed, the developer and municipality wildly differed when 
estimating how intensely the property could be developed.189  As a result, 
the extent to which the rezoning affected the property’s value was 
 
 180. See 2 SALKIN, supra note 22, § 16:12 (explaining that applying for permits, having 
the proposal denied or modified, and applying for variances in response are all necessary to 
satisfy finality). 
 181. See Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 193–94 (noting that finality concerns the final 
decision of an application of regulations to one’s property); Gregory Overstreet, The 
Ripeness Doctrine of the Taking Clause:  A Survey of Decisions Showing Just How Far 
Federal Courts Will Go to Avoid Adjudicating Land Use Cases, 10 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 
91, 96–97 (1994) (explaining that the extent of development that is permitted by the 
regulation is a necessary factor to determine how property is affected). 
 182. See Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 191 (explaining that the Court cannot evaluate the 
factors of a regulatory taking until finality is satisfied); cf. Overstreet, supra note 181, at 96 
(discussing how a final decision is a prerequisite to “whether a taking has occurred”). 
 183. See 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 133, § 3532.1.1, at 423–32 (describing different 
concerns underscoring finality’s application to land use claims). 
 184. See Southview Assocs. v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d 84, 96–97 (2d Cir. 1992) (suggesting 
that finality promotes avoidance of constitutional issues). 
 185. See 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 133, § 3532.1.1, at 423–32. 
 186. See id. (explaining that finality ensures that relevant legal issues can be fully 
explored through the facts on the record). 
 187. Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 194. 
 188. Id. at 193–94. 
 189. Id. at 182 (noting that the developer alleged that only sixty-seven units could be 
constructed in compliance with the zoning laws, while the municipality argued that three 
hundred could be built). 
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unknown,190 and the Court could not ascertain whether the developer 
sustained an injury.191 
2.  Prong Two:  Exhaustion 
The second Williamson County ripeness prong, exhaustion, requires 
plaintiffs to pursue just compensation for the alleged taking in state court 
before seeking compensation in federal court.192  Plaintiffs must exhaust 
any process a state provides for obtaining compensation,193 including 
inverse condemnation claims,194 procedures created by local statutes,195 or 
even proceedings under a state constitution.196  Unless a plaintiff can show 
that an adequate procedure does not exist for his takings claim, failure to 
resort to state remedies will render his claim unripe.197  Failure to pursue 
state remedies for just compensation, even if the remedy sought is equitable 
relief, likewise renders a plaintiff’s claim unripe.198 
The origin of exhaustion is simple:  because the Fifth Amendment 
proscribes only takings “without just compensation,” a state does not 
violate the Fifth Amendment until it fails to fairly compensate the taking of 
private property.199  Any takings claim thus remains unripe “until the State 
fails to provide adequate compensation for the taking,” because up to that 
 
 190. Id. at 194 (explaining that because the plaintiff failed to seek variances, no “final, 
reviewable decision” existed). 
 191. Id. at 191 (suggesting that until variances are denied, whether property can produce 
an economic benefit remains unknown); see Overstreet, supra note 181, at 96 (noting that 
taking cannot be determined until it is clear “exactly how limited” the use of property is). 
 192. Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 194–95 (noting that takings claims are unripe if the 
plaintiff does not first “seek compensation through the procedures the State has provided”); 
BLAESSER & WEINSTEIN, supra note 143, § 12:14, at 1188 (explaining that Williamson 
County requires takings plaintiffs to exhaust state remedies before filing a claim in federal 
court). 
 193. Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 195 (“[I]f a State provides an adequate procedure for 
seeking just compensation, the property owner cannot claim a violation of the Just 
Compensation Clause until it has used the procedure and been denied just compensation.”). 
 194. E.g., id. at 196–97 (finding that the Tennessee inverse condemnation proceeding was 
adequate). 
 195. E.g., Harbours Pointe of Nashotah, L.L.C. v. Vill. of Nashotah, 278 F.3d 701, 704 
(7th Cir. 2002) (local statutory remedy adequate). 
 196. E.g., Vandor, Inc. v. Militello, 301 F.3d 37, 39 (2d Cir. 2002) (“A takings claim is 
unripe where ‘a remedy potentially is available under the state constitution’s provision.’” 
(quoting Villager Pond, Inc. v. Town of Darien, 56 F.3d 375, 380 (2d Cir. 1995))). 
 197. JOHN MARTINEZ, GOVERNMENT TAKINGS § 4:5 (2011) (suggesting that exhaustion is 
not required if no remedy is available); e.g., Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 196–97 (holding 
that the takings claim was unripe because there was no showing of inadequacy or 
unavailability of compensation procedures); see Peters v. Vill. of Clifton, 498 F.3d 727, 732 
(7th Cir. 2007) (“If a property owner demonstrates that state procedures for obtaining just 
compensation are either unavailable or inadequate, the claim is immediately ripe in federal 
court.”). 
 198. E.g., Alto Eldorado P’ship v. Cnty. of Santa Fe, 634 F.3d 1170, 1174 (10th Cir. 
2011) (noting that regardless of the remedy sought, takings claims are unripe unless state 
court just compensation procedures are exhausted). 
 199. Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 194–95 (explaining that there is no violation of the 
Just Compensation Clause until compensation has been denied). 
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point, state action is incomplete.200  Exhaustion therefore ensures that the 
courts have jurisdiction to hear takings, since prior to the denial of just 
compensation, there is no case or controversy that the court can 
adjudicate.201 
In addition to this jurisdictional concern, some prudential ripeness 
considerations also underscore exhaustion.  First, many federal courts are, 
frankly, reticent to hear land use disputes.202  Requiring plaintiffs to first 
sue in state court before bringing a federal takings claim provides a handy 
tool to avoid hearing such claims.203  Second, exhaustion improves 
efficiency by preventing federal courts from intervening in disputes until 
pre-existing procedures meant to provide relief fail to do so.204  If state 
procedures can compensate the taking, federal interference is 
unnecessary—unless a state fails to pay up. 
Williamson County also demonstrates exhaustion in play, as the 
developer failed to exhaust any state court remedies prior to filing his 
regulatory takings claim.205  Tennessee law authorized inverse 
condemnation proceedings for physical invasions of property, as well as de 
facto condemnations of property resulting from restrictive zoning 
regulations.206  Because the developer failed to either exploit or 
demonstrate the inadequacy of this remedy, it did not satisfy exhaustion, 
and its regulatory takings claim remained unripe.207 
While Williamson County decreed this clear, two-pronged ripeness 
requirement for regulatory takings,208 the SDP ripeness standard is 
undetermined.209  Federal courts have, however, used Williamson County as 
a basis for crafting an SDP ripeness standard, and its requirements are 
potentially applicable to federal SDP claims.210  Indeed, Williamson 
County’s ripeness mandates, if unsatisfied, may induce federal courts to 
dismiss SDP claims as unripe.211  Consequently, a circuit split has 
 
 200. Id. at 195. 
 201. See Stein, supra note 168, at 16 (noting that in takings, exhaustion is incorporated 
into the case or controversy requirement). 
 202. See Overstreet, supra note 181, at 103 (identifying federal courts’ unwillingness to 
decide land use disputes as a significant aspect of ripeness); see also infra notes 223, 331 
and accompanying text. 
 203. See 1 ZIEGLER, supra note 6, § 3:18 (explaining that some federal courts use ripeness 
to bar review of zoning disputes). 
 204. See MARTINEZ, supra note 197, § 4:2 (noting that courts avoid becoming involved in 
disputes unless other means of relief are exhausted). 
 205. Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 194 (“A second reason the taking claim is not yet ripe 
is that respondent did not seek compensation through the procedures the State has provided 
for doing so.”). 
 206. Id. at 196. 
 207. Id. at 196–97. 
 208. See supra notes 178–98 and accompanying text. 
 209. See infra Part III. 
 210. BLAESSER & WEINSTEIN, supra note 143, § 12.12, at 1186 (suggesting that 
Williamson County may apply to SDP claims). 
 211. See id. (suggesting that federal courts may dismiss unripe SDP claims that do not 
satisfy Williamson County ripeness); 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 133, § 3532.1.1, at 442 
(noting that constitutional claims asserted alongside regulatory takings are at times subject to 
the same ripeness standard as regulatory takings). 
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developed over the applicability of the second Williamson County prong— 
exhaustion—to SDP claims. 
III.  WILLIAMSON COUNTY AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS RIPENESS:  
THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER EXHAUSTION 
While Part II detailed the ripeness standard for regulatory takings, this 
part focuses on the ripeness requirements for SDP claims.  Like regulatory 
takings, SDP claims may involve the application of regulations to 
property.212  Consequently, many of the ripeness concerns for regulatory 
takings, like avoiding interference in local disputes213 and deciding cases 
only when all necessary facts have been sufficiently developed,214 inform 
SDP ripeness as well.  Nonetheless, different circuits have distinctly applied 
Williamson County ripeness to SDP claims,215 with some applying only 
finality, and others applying exhaustion too.  In fact, a circuit split has 
developed, and two different SDP ripeness standards are currently in use.  
The Second, Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits apply only finality to SDP 
claims, while the First and Seventh apply both finality and exhaustion. 
This part begins with a brief discussion of the universal application of 
finality to SDP claims.  Next, it discusses those circuits that exempt SDP 
claims from exhaustion, highlighting exemplary cases and noting why these 
circuits find SDP claims ripe once they satisfy finality.  Finally, this part 
discusses the First and Seventh Circuits’ application of exhaustion to SDP 
claims, including the reasoning behind their more rigorous standard. 
A.  Universal Application of Finality to Substantive Due Process Claims 
All circuits apply Williamson County finality to as-applied SDP 
claims.216  Finality is an essential prerequisite to SDP claims because, 
 
 212. See supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text. 
 213. See supra note 204 and accompanying text. 
 214. See supra notes 185–86 and accompanying text. 
 215. See infra Part III.B–C. 
 216. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 44, § 10:12 (“Most courts have held that 
the final decision ripeness requirement applies to as-applied, arbitrary and capricious 
substantive due process claims.”); e.g., Cnty. Concrete Corp. v. Twp. of Roxbury, 442 F.3d 
159, 164 (3d Cir. 2006) (finality applies to as-applied SDP claims); Gamble v. Eau Claire 
Cnty., 5 F.3d 285, 287–88 (7th Cir. 1993) (applying Williamson County finality to an 
arbitrary and capricious SDP claim); Southview Assocs. v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d 84, 96–97 (2d 
Cir. 1992) (identifying an SDP claim “premised on arbitrary and capricious government 
conduct” as subject to finality); Eide v. Sarasota Cnty., 908 F.2d 716, 725 (11th Cir. 1990) 
(Williamson County applies to SDP claim).  Finality is not required for facial SDP 
challenges, however. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 44, § 10:12 (facial SDP 
claims not subject to Williamson County); e.g., Cnty. Concrete, 442 F.3d at 164 (facial 
attacks not subject to Williamson County finality); Kittay v. Giuliani, 252 F.3d 645, 646–47 
(2d Cir. 2001) (affirming dismissal of a facial SDP claim on the merits when finality was not 
satisfied); Eide, 908 F.2d at 725 (noting precedent which decided facial SDP claims on the 
merits prior to finality’s satisfaction).  Because facial challenges confront the enactment of a 
regulation directly, not its application in a particular instance, how regulations affect one’s 
property is irrelevant. Katherine E. Stone & Philip A. Seymour, Regulating the Timing of 
Development:  Takings Clause and Substantive Due Process Challenges to Growth Control 
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before the final application of regulations to property, it is impossible to 
know if a landowner has suffered an actual or concrete injury.217  Whether 
regulations are the product of arbitrary or irrational conduct cannot be 
known until the final regulations have actually been promulgated.218  
Furthermore, the extent to which regulations restrict property use, and 
therefore whether a party has even been injured by such restrictions, cannot 
be determined until finality is satisfied.219  Accordingly, jurisdictional 
concerns of only hearing an actual dispute with an actual injury motivate 
finality in SDP ripeness.220 
Prudential concerns underscore finality in the SDP context as well, 
namely concerns over only deciding cases with a fully developed factual 
record.221  Until regulations are finally applied, the circumstances 
surrounding their application are unknown, leaving unclear key facts 
relevant to whether they were applied arbitrarily.222  Moreover, finality 
allows courts to respect the decision-making power of local zoning boards 
and to avoid becoming a federal zoning board of appeals.223  By allowing 
local zoning authorities to render final decisions before ruling on a case, 
federal courts further comity between independent governmental 
institutions.224  For example, the Second Circuit noted that these federalism 
principles underscore finality, explaining that “[r]equiring a property owner 
to obtain a final, definitive position from zoning authorities evinces the 
judiciary’s appreciation that land use disputes are uniquely matters of local 
concern more aptly suited for local resolution.”225 
 
Regulations, 24 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1205, 1237 (1991) (noting that facial challenges allege 
mere enactment of the regulation is an invalid exercise of the police power). 
 217. See 2 SALKIN, supra note 22, § 15:7 (explaining that a final decision is necessary to 
determine if any injury was inflicted). 
 218. Osborne v. Fernandez, No. 06-CV-4127 (CS)(LMS), 2009 WL 884697, at *31 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2009) (noting that the plaintiffs cannot allege that conduct is arbitrary 
and capricious until the challenged conduct is final), aff’d, 414 F. App’x 350 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 219. See 2 SALKIN, supra note 22, § 15:7 (explaining that finality ensures that the 
complaining party has suffered an injury). 
 220. E.g., Murphy v. New Milford Zoning Comm’n, 402 F.3d 342, 347 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(indicating that Article III concerns of fitness for review motivate courts to defer review of 
cases not involving an actual, concrete dispute); see supra notes 148–53 and accompanying 
text. 
 221. E.g., Osborne, 2009 WL 884697, at *31 (noting that finality ensures that the issues 
in plaintiff’s complaint are perfected, or alternatively mooted, if a final decision in plaintiff’s 
favor is granted); see supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
 222. E.g., Murphy, 402 F.3d at 348 (explaining that finality ensures that the record is fully 
developed); see supra notes 185–86 and accompanying text. 
 223. 2 SALKIN, supra note 22, § 15:3 (suggesting that federal courts are reluctant to 
invalidate zoning decisions); e.g., Harlen Assocs. v. Inc. Vill. of Mineola, 273 F.3d 494, 505 
(2d Cir. 2001) (repeating the “admonition that federal courts should not become zoning 
boards of appeal”); Cornell Cos. v. Borough of New Morgan, 512 F. Supp. 2d 238, 256 
(E.D. Pa. 2007) (noting the court’s reluctance to become a zoning board of appeals). 
 224. Murphy, 402 F.3d at 348. 
 225. Id. 
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B.  Circuits Exempting Substantive Due Process Claims from Exhaustion 
Most circuits exempt SDP claims from exhaustion.226  Indeed, neither the 
Second,227 Third,228 Ninth,229 nor Eleventh230 Circuits require plaintiffs to 
exhaust state remedies prior to filing an SDP claim.231  In these circuits, to 
successfully state an SDP claim, once finality is satisfied, a plaintiff must 
show that it had a constitutionally protected property interest that the 
government denied in an arbitrary or irrational manner.232 
 
 226. See 2 SALKIN, supra note 22, § 15:7 (explaining that numerous circuits do not bar 
SDP claims for failing to exhaust state remedies). 
 227. Southview Assocs. v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d 84, 97 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[T]he 
compensation requirement is inapplicable to [plaintiff’s] substantive due process claim 
premised on arbitrary and capricious government conduct.”). 
 228. Cnty. Concrete Corp. v. Town of Roxbury, 442 F.3d 159, 164 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting 
that SDP claims ripen once finality is satisfied). 
 229. Surf & Sand, L.L.C. v. City of Capitola, 717 F. Supp. 2d 934, 938 (N.D. Cal. 2010) 
(denying motion to dismiss SDP claim as unripe because exhaustion was unsatisfied). 
 230. Restigouche, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, 59 F.3d 1208, 1212 (11th Cir. 1995) (noting 
that an SDP claim ripens once finality is satisfied). 
 231. Other circuits have inconsistent or incognizable ripeness requirements.  The Sixth 
and Tenth Circuits appear to exempt SDP claims from exhaustion, but are not explicit in this 
policy. See Signature Props. Int’l Ltd. v. City of Edmond, 310 F.3d 1258, 1267 (10th Cir. 
2002) (noting that Williamson County ripeness applies to SDP claims, but applying only 
finality); Tri-Corp. Mgmt. v. Praznik, 33 F. App’x 742, 748 (6th Cir. 2002) (determing that 
an SDP claim was ripe even though exhaustion was not satisfied, but announcing no explicit 
exemption from exhaustion).  Similarly, the Fifth, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits appear to 
exempt SDP claims from exhaustion, but have not enunciated a clear ripeness standard. See 
Snaza v. City of St. Paul, 548 F.3d 1178, 1182, 1183–84 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that the 
takings claim was unripe for failure to satisfy exhaustion, while the SDP claim was 
dismissed on the merits, with no mention of ripeness); John Corp. v. City of Hous., 214 F.3d 
573, 585 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding an SDP claim to be ripe, but not stating the ripeness 
standard); Tri Cnty. Indus. v. District of Columbia, 104 F.3d 455, 459–60 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
(dismissing an SDP claim, either on the merits or as unripe, without stating the ripeness 
standard).  Finally, the Fourth Circuit purports to exempt SDP claims from exhaustion, but 
also requires, as an essential element of an SDP claim, that plaintiffs seek state court redress 
of SDP injuries. Compare Acorn Land, L.L.C. v. Balt. Cnty., 402 F. App’x 809, 816 n.11 
(4th Cir. 2010) (noting that exhaustion does not apply to SDP claims), with id. at 818 
(dismissing the SDP claim for failure to state a claim when state procedures were not 
exhausted).  
 232. See Harlen Assocs. v. Inc. Vill. of Mineola, 273 F.3d 494, 505 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(holding that plaintiffs must demonstrate that a valid property interest was deprived 
arbitrarily or irrationally); Sameric Corp. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 590 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(“To establish a substantive due process claim, a plaintiff must prove that it was deprived of 
a protected property interest by arbitrary or capricious government action.”); Sinaloa Lake 
Owners Ass’n v. City of Simi Valley, 882 F.2d 1398, 1407 (9th Cir. 1989) (“To establish a 
violation of substantive due process, the plaintiffs must prove that the government’s action 
was ‘clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, 
safety, morals, or general welfare.’” (quoting Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 
365, 395 (1926))), overruled by Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1996); see 
also Eide v. Sarasota Cnty., 908 F.2d 716, 722 (11th Cir. 1990) (“To prove an arbitrary and 
capricious due process claim, a plaintiff need only prove that the government has acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously” in denying a property interest).  The Eleventh Circuit also 
requires that the act be legislative in character. See Lewis v. Brown, 409 F.3d 1271, 1273 
(11th Cir. 2005) (holding that non-legislative acts cannot support an SDP claim). 
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To understand this ripeness standard, take Southview Associates v. 
Bongartz.233  There, the plaintiff challenged a town zoning board’s denial 
of a permit that would have allowed it to develop its property despite its 
potential location within a protected deer habitat.234  The plaintiff 
purchased eighty-eight acres of undeveloped land in rural Vermont with 
intentions of intensely developing the land into seventy-eight vacation 
homes.235  Meanwhile, a Vermont land use statute, Act 250,236 required 
certain categories of development projects237—including the developer’s—
to receive special permits granted by local commissions prior to initiating 
construction.238  Unfortunately for the plaintiff, the Act 250 commission 
determined that the proposed development would interfere with a nearby 
deeryard, an environmental habitat essential to the winter survival of deer, 
and denied the permit application.239  After unsuccessfully appealing the 
commission’s decision to the Vermont Environmental Board and State 
Supreme Court,240 the plaintiff filed suit in federal court.241  In addition to 
regulatory and due process takings claims, the plaintiff alleged that the 
commission arbitrarily denied the permit, violating SDP; thus the court 
engaged in three separate ripeness analyses.242  While concluding that 
regulatory and due process takings claims were subject to both Williamson 
County prongs,243 the court exempted the plaintiff’s SDP claim from the 
exhaustion prong, as the government action was arbitrary and “largely 
unrelated” to pursuing state court compensation.244 
In a similar Ninth Circuit case, Surf & Sand, L.L.C. v. City of Capitola,245 
the plaintiff challenged city ordinances preventing the plaintiff from 
subdividing or selling its property.246  The plaintiff claimed that the 
ordinances, as applied to his property, violated SDP, as they were unrelated 
 
 233. 980 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 234. See id. at 92 (noting that the zoning board denied plaintiff’s Act 250 permit 
application). 
 235. Id. at 89–90 (describing plaintiff’s intent to heavily develop its parcel). 
 236. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6001 (2010). 
 237. Southview, 980 F.2d at 88 (listing types of developments covered by Act 250). 
 238. Id. at 88–89 (describing the approval mechanism required by Act 250 prior to the 
granting of permit allowing development). 
 239. Id. at 90–91 (detailing the Commission’s determination that the parcel was situated 
within a deeryard and its subsequent denial of Act 250 permits). 
 240. Id. at 91–92 (noting both unsuccessful appeals). 
 241. Id. at 92 (indicating that the plaintiff filed suit in federal district court). 
 242. Id. at 96–100 (considering whether Williamson County applies to the plaintiff’s 
takings, due process takings, and SDP claims). 
 243. Id. at 97 (indicating that both prongs of Williamson County apply to regulatory 
takings and due process takings). 
 244. Id. (explaining that the pursuit of state court compensation is unrelated to arbitrary 
and irrational SDP claims).  The court ultimately found the plaintiff’s SDP claim unripe not 
for a failure to satisfy exhaustion, but instead because finality had not been achieved. Id. at 
99 (dismissing as unripe the plaintiff’s SDP claim because finality was not satisfied). 
 245. 717 F. Supp. 2d 934 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 246. See id. at 936 (indicating that the town adopted a “Conversion Ordinance” 
preventing subdivision of mobile home sites, and enacted a Park Closure Ordinance 
imposing duties on mobile home site owners prior to closing). 
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to any legitimate governmental purpose.247  Like the Second Circuit, the 
Ninth Circuit distinguished the plaintiff’s SDP claim from a takings claim 
and engaged in two separate ripeness analyses.248  Consequently, the court 
declined to apply the apparently “illogical” exhaustion requirement to the 
plaintiff’s SDP claim, because SDP claims do not seek just 
compensation.249  After reaching the merits of the claim, the court held that 
the allegations stated an SDP claim for purposes of the motion to 
dismiss.250 
There are numerous reasons why these circuits exempt SDP claims from 
exhaustion.  First, these circuits narrowly read Williamson County 
exhaustion as uniquely applicable to takings claims.251  As such, exhaustion 
is “germane to takings challenges as it stems from the Fifth Amendment’s 
proviso that only takings without ‘just compensation’ infringe that 
Amendment.”252  Because SDP derives from the Fourteenth Amendment, 
which may be violated with or without just compensation,253 exhaustion is 
irrelevant to such claims.  The distinct constitutional sources of SDP and 
takings challenges therefore warrant different ripeness inquiries for each 
claim.254 
Second, because the injury stemming from an SDP violation does not 
require a denial of just compensation,255 these circuits view the 
government’s action as complete regardless of compensation.256  On the 
contrary, the remedies for SDP violations are “invalidation of the regulation 
and actual damages” and do not include just compensation for the taken 
property.257  There is a sufficiently concrete injury, therefore, prior to the 
 
 247. See id. at 939 (detailing allegations that the ordinances merely purported to further 
legitimate objectives). 
 248. See id. at 938 (finding the takings claim unripe, but the SDP claim ripe). 
 249. See id. at 937–38 (noting that exhaustion is inapplicable to arbitrary and irrational 
SDP claims, as due process violations are not remedied by compensation). 
 250. See id. at 939 (finding that an SDP claim was stated, but noting the questionable 
chances of ultimate success). 
 251. See 2 SALKIN, supra note 22, § 15:7 (explaining how exhaustion evolved as an 
essential element of a takings claim). 
 252. Murphy v. New Milford Zoning Comm’n, 402 F.3d 342, 349 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see Cnty. Concrete Corp. v. Twp. of Roxbury, 442 F.3d 159, 168 
(3d Cir. 2006) (explaining that exhaustion addresses a “unique aspect of Just Compensation 
Takings claims”). 
 253. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 254. E.g., N. Pacifica, L.L.C. v. City of Pacifica, 526 F.3d 478, 480 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(noting that an SDP claim is distinct from a takings claims, and thus is not subject to 
exhaustion); see 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 133, § 3532.1.1 n.30, at 443 (explaining 
that because SDP claims do not derive from the Takings Clause, exhaustion does not apply 
to them). 
 255. See Breemer, supra note 55, at 641–42 (indicating that a takings injury is a denial of 
just compensation, not a prior irrational action). 
 256. Id. at 642 (suggesting that arbitrary governmental action alone inflicts an injury). 
 257. Cnty. Concrete, 442 F.3d at 168; see Surf & Sand, L.L.C. v. City of Capitola, 717 F. 
Supp. 2d 934, 938 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (“[I]t would be illogical to require a plaintiff to seek 
compensation in state proceedings for a due process violation, because such violations, if 
proven, are not remedied by ‘compensation.’”). 
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denial of just compensation, and these circuits consider it proper to exercise 
jurisdiction over SDP claims before plaintiffs exhaust state remedies.258 
Third, while both SDP and regulatory takings claims challenge the 
regulation of property, these distinct claims “scrutinize that process in 
slightly different ways.”259  While takings concern the deprivation of a 
property’s economic value, SDP claims alternatively attack the “decision to 
apply the zoning to the property” as arbitrary or irrational.260  Takings, 
therefore, mature only when this economic value—just compensation—has 
been deprived.261  Because SDP claims lack this economic component, 
these circuits find them ripe once regulations are finally applied to the 
property.262  As there is a “sufficiently concrete question for review” as 
soon as the decision to apply regulations is final, these circuits find SDP 
claims ripe once this threshold is met.263 
Notably, for ripeness purposes, these circuits sometimes distinguish 
between SDP claims and due process takings.264  While the former are 
exempted from exhaustion,265 the latter may be subject to both prongs of 
Williamson County,266 because such due process takings claims are 
essentially identical to regulatory takings claims.267  Since these due 
process violations involve questions of law that are practically identical to 
takings, it follows that the ripeness standard is identical too.268 
In sum, because of the distinct natures of SDP and takings claims,269 
these circuits apply different ripeness standards to each claim.  By 
borrowing finality, but not exhaustion, from Williamson County, these 
circuits apply a unique ripeness analysis to SDP claims, as exhaustion, in 
their view, is irrelevant to these claims.270 
 
 258. See Breemer, supra note 55, at 641–42 (noting that the absence of just compensation 
is not part of an SDP inquiry). 
 259. Restigouche, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, 59 F.3d 1208, 1212 (11th Cir. 1995). 
 260. Id. 
 261. See id. (explaining that takings claims are ripe after the extent of permitted 
development is clear and compensation is sought). 
 262. See id. (holding that the SDP claim was ripe, because the zoning decision was finally 
made). 
 263. Id. 
 264. See Shanks v. Dressel, 540 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that the 
Takings Clause subsumes SDP claims that do not allege arbitrary and capricious conduct); 
Villas of Lake Jackson, Ltd. v. Leon Cnty., 121 F.3d 610, 613–14 (11th Cir. 1997); 
Southview Assocs. v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d 84, 96 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[A] substantive due 
process claim premised on the theory that a regulation has gone too far is subject to both 
prongs of the Williamson[ County] ripeness test.”). 
 265. See supra notes 226–63 and accompanying text. 
 266. See Shanks, 540 F.3d at 1087 (explaining how takings analysis governs SDP claims 
which fail to allege arbitrary action); Gavlak v. Town of Somers, 267 F. Supp. 2d 214, 220 
(D. Conn. 2003). 
 267. See, e.g., Southview Assocs., 980 F.2d at 96 n.7 (explaining that due process takings 
“can only occur if the regulation has the same effect as a taking by eminent domain,” and are 
thus essentially the same as regulatory takings); supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 268. See Southview Assocs., 980 F.2d at 97 (applying both prongs of Williamson County 
to takings and due process takings claims). 
 269. See, e.g., supra notes 249, 259 and accompanying text. 
 270. See supra notes 251–63 and accompanying text. 
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C.  Circuits Subjecting Substantive Due Process Claims to Exhaustion 
Contrary to the aforementioned circuits, the First and Seventh Circuits 
apply exhaustion to SDP claims.271  This is so despite their recognition that 
SDP claims are different from takings challenges.272 
The Seventh Circuit first addressed SDP ripeness in Gamble v. Eau 
Claire County,273 where the plaintiff sued after failing to secure permits 
necessary to build a convenience store, gas station, and car repair shop on 
her property.274  Although the plaintiff originally obtained the required 
permits, the zoning agency revoked them after neighbors complained; the 
zoning board of appeals ultimately affirmed this decision.275  The plaintiff 
challenged this revocation as irrational and a violation of her SDP rights.276  
After distinguishing her SDP and takings claims—as the SDP claim sought 
invalidation of the regulations or full pecuniary damages, not just 
compensation277—the court noted it was “not obvious” that SDP claims 
“should require exhaustion of state remedies.”278  Despite such ruminations, 
the court ultimately held that Williamson County mandated that “even if a 
taking can be challenged as a denial of substantive due process, a suit based 
on this theory is premature if the plaintiff has possible state remedies 
against the zoning regulation or other state action that he wants to 
attack.”279  Noting the rare success of SDP claims,280 the Gamble court 
broadly interpreted Williamson County as imposing a duty to exhaust state 
judicial remedies on plaintiffs bringing federal civil rights suits in the land 
use context and declined to address the purportedly unripe SDP claim.281 
The Seventh Circuit honed its ripeness standard in Covington Court, Ltd. 
v. Village of Oak Brook,282 where the plaintiff asserted a § 1983 SDP claim 
 
 271. See Deniz v. Municipality of Guaynabo, 285 F.3d 142, 149 (1st Cir. 2002) 
(explaining that an SDP claim does not lie until exhaustion is satisfied); Gamble v. Eau 
Claire Cnty., 5 F.3d 285, 288 (7th Cir. 1993) (dismissing the plaintiff’s SDP claim for failing 
to exhaust “state judicial remedies”). 
 272. See Gen. Auto Serv. Station v. City of Chi., 526 F.3d 991, 1000–01 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(noting that SDP protects property rights from “random and irrational” government action); 
Mongeau v. City of Marlborough, 492 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 2007) (explaining how a land use 
SDP claim was stated because plaintiff pled activity which shocked the conscience); Doherty 
v. City of Chi., 75 F.3d 318, 325 (7th Cir. 1996) (recognizing “the potential for a substantive 
due process claim in the context of land-use decisions that are arbitrary and unreasonable, 
bearing no substantial relationship to the public health, safety or welfare”). 
 273. 5 F.3d 285 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 274. Id. at 285 (describing the plaintiff’s construction plans). 
 275. See id. 
 276. See id. (noting that the county revoked the plaintiff’s permits). 
 277. See id. at 286 (indicating that the plaintiff’s SDP claim is different from a takings 
claim). 
 278. Id. (describing the nature of the plaintiff’s suit as distinguished from a takings 
claim). 
 279. Id. at 287. 
 280. Id. (noting that success under an SDP theory is “rare”). 
 281. Id. at 288 (noting that Williamson County creates an “exception to the principle that 
exhaustion of state remedies is not required in a federal civil rights suit,” in affirming the 
dismissal of an SDP claim). 
 282. 77 F.3d 177 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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as a result of an alleged private taking.283  There, the plaintiff developer 
acquired all but one lot in a residential area, Whitehall Park, with plans to 
construct a residential subdivision.284  Unfortunately for the plaintiff, the 
owner of the sole lot remaining in Whitehall Park, Bailes, opposed the 
development plans.285  Even more unsettling was Bailes’s influence over 
the zoning board, whose president informed the plaintiff that until Bailes 
was on board, the zoning board would not approve the development.286  
After the plaintiff appeased Bailes by making over $100,000 worth of 
improvements to Bailes’s lot, Bailes withdrew his opposition, and the 
zoning board approved the development.287  Although able to develop, the 
plaintiff challenged the board’s conditioning of his development approval 
on Bailes’s acquiescence as both a private taking and an SDP violation.288  
Even though the claim raised due process concerns,289 the court continued 
what it started in Gamble and decreed that SDP claims, regardless of their 
allegations, remain unripe until plaintiffs exhaust state court remedies.290  
Viewing SDP and takings claims as identical, the court held that “[l]abels 
do not matter” and mandated that plaintiffs challenging land use regulations 
under SDP or takings theories must exhaust state court remedies before 
filing suit in federal court.291 
Finally, in Forseth v. Village of Sussex,292 the Seventh Circuit finalized 
its SDP ripeness standard, definitively applying exhaustion to SDP 
claims.293  In Forseth, the plaintiff landowners filed a § 1983 challenge294 
against the Village of Sussex for conditioning the approval of their 
proposed development on conveying a piece of land to the Village Board 
president.295  Indeed, the allegations in Forseth were strikingly similar to 
those in Covington296:  because the pre-conditions to final approval were 
allegedly unrelated to any legitimate governmental objective, the plaintiffs 
contended that the regulations violated SDP.297  Relying heavily on 
Covington,298 the Seventh Circuit reasoned that because the plaintiff’s SDP 
 
 283. See id. at 178 (alleging an SDP violation under § 1983). 
 284. Id. (noting the plaintiff’s acquisition of all but one lot, and the plaintiff’s plans to 
build). 
 285. Id. (indicating that the remaining resident Bailes opposed development). 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. (noting the plaintiff’s allegations). 
 289. Id. at 179 (suggesting that private takings raise due process concerns). 
 290. Id. (holding that SDP claims challenging regulations are unripe until state remedies 
are exhausted). 
 291. Id. (quoting River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 23 F.3d 164, 167 (7th Cir. 
1994)) (applying exhaustion to a due process challenge of regulations). 
 292. 199 F.3d 363 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 293. Id. at 370 (indicating that an SDP claim is subject to both finality and exhaustion). 
 294. Id. at 365 (noting that Forseth sued under § 1983). 
 295. Id. at 366 (noting that conditioning the approval of a final development plan on the 
conveyance of a buffer strip to the Village Board president forms the basis of plaintiff’s 
claim). 
 296. Id. at 370 (noting that the allegations were “unmistakably similar” to Covington). 
 297. Id. at 369 (alleging that the regulations furthered private, not public, interests). 
 298. Id. at 370 (comparing the allegations to, and drawing the same legal conclusion as, 
Covington). 
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claim fell “within the framework for takings claims,” it was subject to 
identical ripeness requirements.299  The court recognized its draconian 
application of exhaustion, acknowledging that it even applied to cases 
involving “troubling facts and allegations” of improper governmental 
conduct.300  Nonetheless, in applying exhaustion, the court made eminently 
clear that it would not “excuse any substantive due process claim in the 
land-use context from Williamson[ County]’s ripeness requirements,” 
regardless of the seriousness of the allegations involved.301 
The First Circuit also applies exhaustion to SDP claims.302  Take, for 
example, Deniz v. Municipality of Guaynabo,303 where the plaintiff asserted 
numerous claims, including § 1983 SDP and regulatory takings claims, 
after a municipality threatened to condemn his property.304  There, the 
plaintiff’s takings claim was unripe for failing to satisfy exhaustion, as the 
court rejected his argument that no adequate compensation procedures 
existed.305  Skeptical of his SDP claim,306 the court further held that the 
plaintiff could not avoid Williamson County by “[d]ressing a takings claim 
in the raiment of a due process violation,” and applied exhaustion to it as 
well.307  Using sweeping language similar to Forseth’s,308 the court held 
that “no substantive due process claim will lie” until exhaustion is 
satisfied.309  Indeed, in interpreting Deniz, the First Circuit has determined 
that any claim coextensive with a taking must satisfy exhaustion.310 
Notably, in Downing v. Rhode Island,311 the First Circuit recognized the 
possibility that SDP claims may be distinct enough from takings to warrant 
different ripeness requirements.312  In that case, a developer challenged the 
Rhode Island Historic Preservation and Heritage Committee’s order to halt 
the development of his property, because it was the alleged site of a historic 
Native American settlement, as violative of SDP.313  In dicta, the lower 
court noted that were a plaintiff to rely on different elements of proof—such 
as conscious shocking action for an SDP claim—such claims may warrant a 
 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. at 369. 
 302. Deniz v. Municipality of Guaynabo, 285 F.3d 142, 149 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting that 
no SDP claim lies until exhaustion is satisfied). 
 303. Id. 
 304. Id. at 145 (explaining that the mayor intended to exercise eminent domain). 
 305. Id. at 146, 149 (noting and rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that Puerto Rican law 
affords no remedy for an inverse condemnation). 
 306. See id. at 145 (noting that the plaintiff, “[f]or good measure,” added an SDP claim to 
his takings claim). 
 307. Id. at 149. 
 308. Compare text accompanying infra note 309, with text accompanying supra note 301. 
 309. Deniz, 285 F.3d at 149. 
 310. Downing/Salt Pond Partners, L.P. v. Rhode Island, 698 F. Supp. 2d 278, 289 (D.R.I. 
2010), aff’d, 643 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 502 (2011). 
 311. Id. 
 312. See id. at 290 (suggesting that the “unique elements of proof” for an SDP claim 
could warrant different treatment of SDP claims). 
 313. Id. at 279 (explaining how the preservation commission halted plans to develop 
sixty-seven acres of property, which the plaintiff challenged as violative of SDP). 
440 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
different analysis from a takings claim.314  Nevertheless, on appeal, the 
First Circuit declined to specifically address whether the plaintiff’s SDP 
claim could proceed, despite failing to satisfy exhaustion, when it arose 
“from the same allegedly illegal state conduct” as a taking.315  Instead, the 
court cited to Deniz, noting that disguising a takings claim as a due process 
violation could not serve to circumvent Williamson County, and dismissed 
the claim as unripe.316 
1.  Why Apply Exhaustion? 
Whether jurisdictional or prudential ripeness concerns underlie these 
circuits’ application of exhaustion is unclear, as they sometimes interpret 
Williamson County to impose jurisdictional limits, while at other times they 
highlight its prudential goals.317  For example, in Forseth, the Seventh 
Circuit referred to Williamson County’s jurisdictional decree in dismissing 
the unripe SDP claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.318  On the other 
hand, in Peters v. Village of Clifton,319 the court viewed Williamson County 
not as a jurisdictional limit, but merely as a Supreme Court mandate with 
which the court was forced to comply.320  In spite of this conflicted 
interpretation, a number of common themes pervade the First and Seventh 
Circuits’ jurisprudence, revealing their primary motivations behind 
applying exhaustion.321 
2.  Uncovering ‘Takings in Disguise’ 
These circuits’ primary motivation to apply exhaustion is to prevent 
plaintiffs from circumventing Williamson County by labeling their takings 
claims as SDP claims.322  Numerous advantages are associated with 
framing one’s claim as SDP rather than as a takings, such as more favorable 
 
 314. Id. at 290 (noting the different elements of SDP and other claims, which if relied 
upon, distinguish them from takings analysis). 
 315. Downing/Salt Pond Partners, L.P. v. Rhode Island, 643 F.3d 16, 28 (1st Cir. 2011) 
(declining to consider arguments that Williamson County ripeness applies only to takings 
claims), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 502 (2011). 
 316. Id. (noting that the First Circuit has “previously held that a plaintiff cannot, merely 
by recasting its takings claim ‘in the raiment of a due process violation,’ evade the 
Williamson County ripeness requirements”). 
 317. Compare id. at 20 (noting that federal courts lack jurisdiction before the Williamson 
County prongs are satisfied), and Flying J Inc. v. City of New Haven, 549 F.3d 538, 544 (7th 
Cir. 2008) (“The point of Williamson County is that there is no case or controversy within 
the meaning of Article III until the plaintiff has pursued all available remedies in state 
court.”), with Peters v. Vill. of Clifton, 498 F.3d 727, 734 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Williamson 
County’s ripeness requirements are prudential in nature.”). 
 318. See Forseth v. Vill. of Sussex, 199 F.3d 363, 370 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that SDP 
claims must satisfy exhaustion before federal courts have jurisdiction). 
 319. 498 F.3d 727 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 320. See id. at 734 (explaining that the prudential nature of Williamson County does not 
empower federal courts to deviate from Supreme Court requirements). 
 321. See infra notes 322–34 and accompanying text. 
 322. E.g., River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 23 F.3d 164, 167 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(explaining that one cannot “avoid Williamson by applying the label ‘substantive due 
process’” to their claim). 
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remedies and presumably less stringent ripeness requirements, which 
incentivizes plaintiffs to frame what are essentially takings challenges as 
SDP claims.323  The Seventh Circuit closes this apparent loophole to 
Williamson County by applying exhaustion to SDP claims that are 
“essentially a takings claim.”324  Consequently, any SDP claim—regardless 
of the allegations therein—when “based on the same facts as a takings 
claim,” is subject to exhaustion.325  Similarly, the First Circuit applies 
exhaustion to claims based on “other legal theories . . . that, in substance, 
allege no more than a takings claim.”326  These claims, whose “key issues” 
are the same as a takings claim, are therefore subject to Williamson 
County.327  While the Second, Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits thus 
distinguish between these disguised due process takings and SDP claims for 
ripeness purposes,328 the First and Seventh Circuits do not. 
3.  Reluctance to Decide Substantive Due Process Claims 
The Seventh and First Circuits’ general skepticism of SDP claims also 
fuels their application of exhaustion.329  These courts are disinclined to hear 
SDP claims because the chances of successfully stating an SDP claim are 
rather low.330  Indeed, when addressing SDP claims, courts in these circuits 
often note the minimal chances plaintiffs have in succeeding on an SDP 
claim.331  This high threshold to success, combined with the local nature of 
these land use disputes,332 results in a severe aversion to federal 
adjudication of SDP claims.  Requiring plaintiffs to first bring these claims 
 
 323. TJ’s S., Inc. v. Town of Lowell, 895 F. Supp. 1116, 1122 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (noting 
that SDP became the “theory of choice” in the Seventh Circuit because the remedies and 
procedural requirements were different than those associated with takings), amended by 924 
F. Supp. 92 (N.D. Ind. 1996). 
 324. Id.; see, e.g., River Park, 23 F.3d at 167 (“Labels do not matter.  A person 
contending that state or local regulation of the use of land has gone overboard must repair to 
state court.”); Hamed v. City of Belleville, No. 09–cv-718-DRH, 2010 WL 3359460, at *3 
(S.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2010) (explaining that Williamson County applies to takings claims 
“guised” as SDP violations). 
 325. Greenfield Mills, Inc. v. Macklin, 361 F.3d 934, 961 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 326. Downing/Salt Pond Partners, L.P. v. Rhode Island, 698 F. Supp. 2d 278, 289 (D.R.I. 
2010), aff’d, 643 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 502 (2011). 
 327. Id. (identifying claims whose key issues are the same as takings claims subject to the 
same ripeness requirements); see supra notes 309–10 and accompanying text. 
 328. See supra notes 264–68 and accompanying text. 
 329. TJ’s S., Inc., 895 F. Supp. at 1122 (explaining that because SDP claims pass 
“constitutional muster easily,” Seventh Circuit courts consider such challenges more 
appropriately filed in state court), amended by 924 F. Supp. 92 (N.D. Ind. 1996). 
 330. E.g., Polenz v. Parrott, 883 F.2d 551, 558 (7th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he federal courts are 
not zoning boards of appeal and will not overturn merely erroneous decisions.”); supra notes 
35–40, 68, 306 and accompanying text. 
 331. See, e.g., Forseth v. Vill. of Sussex, 199 F.3d 363, 369 (7th Cir. 2000) (explaining 
that a hurdle to success through SDP theory “would be high and difficult” to clear); Gamble 
v. Eau Claire Cnty., 5 F.3d 285, 287 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that success under SDP theory is 
“rare”); Polenz, 883 F.2d at 558 (“[A] plaintiff bears a very heavy burden in a substantive 
due process action attacking a decision of local zoning officials.”). 
 332. See, e.g., Covington Court, Ltd. v. Vill. of Oak Brook, 77 F.3d 177, 178 (7th Cir. 
1996) (noting that the SDP claim involved an “attempt to convert a decidedly local issue into 
a constitutional takings claim”). 
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in state court thus provides an easy dismissal mechanism for SDP claims.333  
As such, exhaustion operates as a tool to avoid adjudicating SDP claims.334 
The Seventh Circuit’s reluctance to hear land use disputes is further 
evidenced by an additional essential element of SDP claims that only it 
requires.335  To state an SDP claim in the Seventh Circuit, one must show 
“1) that the state’s decision was arbitrary and irrational, and 2) that the state 
committed a separate constitutional violation or that state law remedies are 
inadequate.”336  Although it has acknowledged its status as the lone circuit 
requiring proof of a separate constitutional violation,337 the Seventh Circuit 
notes its desire to exercise a “disciplined jurisprudence” in deciding land 
use disputes to justify its extra pleading requirement.338  This supplemental 
element underscores the Seventh Circuit’s disinclination to entertain SDP 
claims in general, as it heightens the already onerous burden a plaintiff must 
show to bring an SDP claim.339 
In sum, two primary concerns fuel the Seventh and First Circuits’ 
application of exhaustion.  First, its across the board application to all SDP 
claims ensures crafty litigants asserting disguised takings claims do not 
evade Williamson County’s requirements.340  Second, these circuits are 
simply reticent to hear SDP claims in general, and use exhaustion to 
decrease the frequency with which they are forced to adjudicate them.341  
When comparing this more stringent ripeness standard with the less onerous 
requirements of the Second, Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, however, 
one ripeness analysis emerges as superior. 
 
 333. See 1 ZIEGLER, supra note 6, § 3:18 (noting that some federal courts impose ripeness 
to bar review of SDP claims). 
 334. E.g., Hager v. City of W. Peoria, 84 F.3d 865, 869–70 (7th Cir. 1996) (dismissing an 
SDP claim when exhaustion was unsatisfied); see Rohr, supra note 127, at 1824 (indicating 
that the Seventh Circuit broadly interprets Williamson County to keep local zoning disputes 
in state court). 
 335. Compare supra note 232 and accompanying text, with infra note 336 and 
accompanying text.  Even the First Circuit does not require this extra element, for that 
matter. See Mongeau v. City of Marlborough, 492 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 2007) (explaining 
that SDP is violated by constitutional deprivation through conscious shocking action by 
governmental official). 
 336. Contreras v. City of Chi., 119 F.3d 1286, 1295 (7th Cir. 1997); see Gen. Auto Serv. 
Station v. City of Chi., 526 F.3d 991, 1000–01 (7th Cir. 2008) (indicating that SDP land use 
challenges must allege an arbitrary action and an independent constitutional violation, or 
inadequacy of state law remedies). 
 337. Doherty v. City of Chi., 75 F.3d 318, 325–26 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that other 
circuits require neither a separate constitutional violation, nor inadequacy of remedies). 
 338. Id. at 325 (noting that “[a]s a result” of a need for disciplined jurisprudence in 
zoning disputes, courts in the Seventh Circuit require an additional constitutional violation or 
inadequacy of state remedies). 
 339. See supra notes 10, 36–40, 61, 63, 66–67 and accompanying text (courts rarely 
strike down regulations). 
 340. See supra notes 322–27 and accompanying text. 
 341. See supra notes 329–38 and accompanying text. 
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IV.  THE FIRST AND SEVENTH CIRCUITS’ APPLICATION OF EXHAUSTION IS 
UNNECESSARY, INEFFICIENT, AND UNJUST 
As discussed in Part III, circuits that exempt SDP claims from exhaustion 
focus on different ripeness concerns than those that require exhaustion.  In 
balancing these considerations against the need for efficiency and equity, 
however, it is clear that applying exhaustion to SDP claims simply does not 
make sense. 
This part argues that exhaustion should not be applied to SDP claims for 
three primary reasons.  First, because SDP claims ripen once they satisfy 
finality, federal courts can thus properly adjudicate them at this point.342  
Second, because exhaustion is inefficient—as it astronomically increases 
SDP plaintiffs’ costs and needlessly depletes state court resources,343 while 
simultaneously stagnating land development344—its application is, frankly, 
wasteful.  Finally, as exhaustion arms defendants with an unfair procedural 
tool, its application to SDP claims is particularly unjust, further exposing 
the erroneous logic behind its application.345 
A.  Substantive Due Process Claims Ripen Once Regulations Are Finally 
Applied to Property 
First and foremost, exhaustion should not be applied to SDP claims 
because SDP claims ripen upon satisfying finality.  As required,346 once the 
regulations at issue are finally applied, there is a clear record from which a 
court can ascertain all the relevant facts and make an accurate and just 
decision regarding whether regulations are arbitrary.347  After this threshold 
inquiry is met, a court has all the facts necessary to properly decide SDP 
claims.348  A suit pursuing just compensation is entirely irrelevant to the 
validity of land use regulations, and has no effect on any facts relevant to an 
SDP claim.349  Therefore, padding the factual record with the inevitably 
irrelevant facts resulting from the just compensation claim furthers no 
legitimate purpose in an SDP ripeness analysis. 
Moreover, the defendant’s action is complete once regulations are finally 
applied, as the disputed regulations have affected the property, and the 
plaintiff has sustained a concrete injury if the regulations violate SDP.350  
Deferring judgment at this point does not further the central aim of ripeness, 
to avoid rendering unnecessary decisions,351 as judicial intervention could 
resolve the central issue at hand:  whether the challenged regulations further 
 
 342. See infra Part IV.A 
 343. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 344. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 345. See infra Part IV.C. 
 346. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
 347. See supra notes 181, 184–85 and accompanying text (indicating that finality ensures 
that the record is fully developed, and that there is a concrete injury requiring judicial 
redress). 
 348. See supra notes 221–22, 262–63 and accompanying text. 
 349. See supra Part I.D.1.b (SDP and takings are separate claims). 
 350. See supra Part III.A, notes 255–58, 262–63 and accompanying text. 
 351. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
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a legitimate governmental interest.352  Consequently, SDP claims are ripe 
upon achieving finality, and federal courts have jurisdiction to hear SDP 
claims at this point in the litigation.353 
Despite SDP claims ripening at finality, the First and Seventh Circuits 
claim Williamson County clearly mandates that SDP claims must satisfy 
exhaustion.354  This, however, ignores the text and facts of that seminal 
case.  As discussed, Williamson County dealt with a regulatory taking.355  
The exhaustion requirement thus resulted from the unique circumstances of 
the takings claim facing the Court.356  In regulatory takings, exhaustion 
ensures that plaintiffs have suffered an injury—a taking without just 
compensation—by forcing them to be denied just compensation in state 
court.357  In contrast, commanding SDP plaintiffs to pursue compensation 
furthers no logical purpose, as these litigants do not even seek such a 
remedy.358  Indeed, the Second, Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits 
correctly note that this fact was essential to Williamson County’s 
holding.359  Conversely, the First and Seventh Circuits’ expansive reading 
of Williamson County results neither in changes to the record, nor in 
changes to the position of the parties post-exhaustion, which render SDP 
claims more fit for judicial review.  In fact, prudential ripeness 
considerations overwhelmingly fuel their application of exhaustion,360 
rendering arguments that they lack jurisdiction to hear SDP claims 
inapposite. 
Although ripeness is integral in determining whether a federal court can 
properly adjudicate claims, it cannot be used as a construct to prevent 
plaintiffs from vindicating federal rights in federal courts merely because 
their federal rights arise in the land use context.361  Nonetheless, one of the 
primary reasons the First and Seventh Circuits apply exhaustion is to 
prevent their dockets from resembling a federal zoning board of appeals.362  
Despite the numerous reasons why these circuits propose that land use 
claims are more apt for state court resolution,363 § 1983 SDP claims are a 
federal cause of action over which federal courts have jurisdiction.364  But 
for the expansive reading of Williamson County adopted by these circuits, 
jurisdiction over § 1983 SDP claims would be a given.365  As a result, that 
 
 352. See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text. 
 353. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
 354. See supra notes 317–21 and accompanying text. 
 355. See supra notes 171–78 and accompanying text. 
 356. See supra notes 199–200 and accompanying text. 
 357. See supra notes 199–201 and accompanying text (indicating that no constitutional 
violation, and thus no case or controversy, exists until compensation is denied). 
 358. See supra notes 255–58 and accompanying text. 
 359. See supra notes 252–59 and accompanying text. 
 360. See supra notes 322–34 and accompanying text (indicating that docket control and 
efficiency are primary motivations behind exhaustion). 
 361. See supra notes 202–03, 329–32 and accompanying text. 
 362. See supra notes 329–34 and accompanying text. 
 363. See supra notes 329–32 and accompanying text. 
 364. See supra notes 54–55, 140–41, 283, 294, 304 and accompanying text. 
 365. See supra notes 138–41 and accompanying text. 
2012] MUST LAND USE CLAIMS BE SO “EXHAUST”ING? 445 
the First and Seventh Circuits are not federal zoning boards of appeal is of 
no matter;366 at stake in SDP claims are constitutional rights, which the 
federal courts are empowered, indeed required, to vindicate.367  In fact, a 
central purpose of federal courts is to facilitate vindication of federal 
rights,368 whatever the context may be.  Nevertheless, exhaustion impedes 
plaintiffs’ access to the federal court system, unnecessarily requiring them 
to file suit in state court, simply due to the context in which their 
constitutional claim arises.369 
To be sure, the First and Seventh Circuits are correct in applying 
exhaustion to takings in disguise.370  In fact, applying exhaustion to these 
claims is consistent with Williamson County371 and the weight of the 
circuits.372  Exhaustion is only illogical when applied to SDP claims that 
are not actually takings in disguise.  Nonetheless, the First and Seventh 
Circuits’ blanket rule that all SDP claims based on the same facts as a 
taking must be takings in disguise is overly broad,373 applying more to SDP 
claims than to just takings claims labeled as such.  Because the Supreme 
Court has mandated that takings and SDP claims must be analyzed 
separately,374 the First and Seventh Circuits must apply distinct ripeness 
standards to each claim.  Like the Second, Third, Ninth, and Eleventh 
Circuits, the First and Seventh Circuits should distinguish between takings 
in disguise and bona fide SDP claims,375 applying exhaustion only to the 
former. 
B.  Exhaustion’s Side Effects Render It Inefficient 
In addition to furthering no logical purpose in SDP ripeness, exhaustion 
certainly lives up to its name in the First and Seventh Circuits.  Instead of 
guiding courts to properly adjudicate disputes, exhaustion depletes both 
plaintiffs’ and state courts’ resources by unnecessarily prolonging and 
complicating land use challenges.  Although exhaustion does provide these 
circuits with an easy dismissal mechanism to keep their dockets clear of 
land use disputes,376 it comes at an unjustifiable cost. 
 
 366. See supra note 334 and accompanying text.  In any event, circuits exempting SDP 
claims also share this concern. See supra notes 300–01, 329–34, and accompanying text.  If 
they can hear SDP claims, so too can the First and Seventh Circuits. 
 367. See supra notes 135–41 and accompanying text. 
 368. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
 369. See supra note 281 and accompanying text (indicating that federal civil rights suits 
normally do not require exhaustion, except in the land use context). 
 370. See supra notes 322–27 and accompanying text. 
 371. See supra note 177 and accompanying text (indicating that Williamson County may 
have applied to a due process taking). 
 372. See supra notes 264–68 and accompanying text. 
 373. See supra notes 322–27 and accompanying text. 
 374. See supra notes 104–09 and accompanying text. 
 375. Compare supra notes 264–68 (applying exhaustion only to due process takings), 
with supra Part III.C.2 (applying exhaustion to all SDP claims, presuming that they are 
takings in disguise). 
 376. See supra notes 300–01, 329–34 and accompanying text. 
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1.  Exhaustion Wastes Plaintiff and State Court Resources 
By applying exhaustion to SDP claims, the First and Seventh Circuits 
order plaintiffs to bring an identical challenge in state court.377  
Nonetheless, since it is so hard to prevail on SDP claims,378 these circuits 
should conserve the parties’ and state courts’ resources by simply reaching 
the merits of these likely ill-fated suits in the first instance.  In SDP 
ripeness, exhaustion serves prudential goals to fetter out takings in disguise 
and avoid adjudicating land use disputes.379  This purportedly efficient use 
of exhaustion380 is anything but.  Conversely, mandating plaintiffs to refile 
their likely ill-fated SDP claims in state court does nothing more than waste 
judicial resources and prolong the near inevitable dismissal of the SDP 
claim.381 
An argument in favor of exhaustion—that is, in favor of placing an 
onerous load on plaintiffs asserting SDP challenges—may sound like this:  
a high cost associated with asserting SDP claims will deter a large number 
of plaintiffs from ever filing these mostly unsuccessful suits in the first 
place.  Perhaps this potential deterrent effect motivates the First and 
Seventh Circuits’ application of exhaustion.  While this approach does have 
logical merits, and could theoretically serve to deter some landowners from 
filing suit, it does not appear to be working.  Instead, plaintiffs continue to 
file SDP claims, prompting repeated dismissals on ripeness grounds.382  As 
such, the deterrence sought from applying exhaustion has simply not 
occurred.  Consequently, these circuits should take a different approach to 
handling SDP claims and reach the claims’ merits as soon as possible. 
Determining whether a land use regulation violates SDP is a relatively 
simple task for federal courts:  they must only decide whether regulations 
are so arbitrary or irrational that their application cannot be related to any 
conceivable legitimate governmental purpose.383  Perhaps due to the high 
burden plaintiffs must meet in proving the illegitimacy of land use 
regulations, most federal courts do not apply exhaustion to SDP claims.384  
Indeed, courts exempting SDP claims from exhaustion are just as 
deferential to local governments as the First and Seventh Circuits, and it is 
 
 377. See supra note 192 and accompanying text (indicating that plaintiffs cannot satisfy 
exhaustion unless they have first filed their SDP challenge in state court). 
 378. See supra notes 10, 36, 40, 67, 250 and accompanying text. 
 379. See supra Part III.C.2–3. 
 380. See supra notes 333, 338 and accompanying text (applying exhaustion to control 
docket size and exercise judicial restraint). 
 381. See supra notes 10, 36, 40, 67, 250 and accompanying text (indicating that SDP 
claims are hard to prevail on). 
 382. E.g., LaFlamboy v. Landek, 587 F. Supp. 2d 914, 949 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (noting that 
the plaintiff asserted an SDP claim alongside his takings claim without satisfying 
exhaustion); Schneider v. Cnty. of Will, 190 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1092 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (noting 
that the plaintiff asserted an SDP claim independent from a takings claim without satisfying 
exhaustion); see supra note 316 and accompanying text (dismissing an SDP claim for lack of 
ripeness). 
 383. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text. 
 384. See supra Part III.B. 
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equally difficult to succeed on the merits in other circuits.385  
Notwithstanding such deference, courts not applying exhaustion often 
manage to reach the merits of SDP claims, directly scrutinizing the disputed 
regulations.386  Because courts strongly defer to the validity of land use 
laws, dismissing SDP claims is easily accomplished.387  In fact, the First 
and Seventh Circuits routinely acknowledge that SDP challenges on the 
merits are almost always destined to fail.388  As a result, they should be 
inclined to employ less stringent ripeness standards to enable a dismissal on 
the merits and definitively terminate the dispute. 
Of course, not all SDP claims can be so easily dismissed.389  
Nonetheless, in the unlikely event that a plaintiff does state an SDP 
violation, is this not the exact reason plaintiffs can challenge land use 
regulations through § 1983?  The entire purpose of allowing plaintiffs to 
contest land use laws is to allow them to invalidate those that violate their 
constitutional rights.390  To avoid adjudicating SDP claims that may 
actually state a claim, therefore, cannot motivate federal courts’ application 
of exhaustion. 
Indeed, even assuming for the sake of argument that it is more efficient 
to dismiss SDP claims on ripeness grounds rather than on the merits, this 
alone is not sufficient to justify such a draconian ripeness policy.  Indeed, 
ripeness analyses must balance the benefits of dismissing a case as unripe 
against the hardships to the parties that may result.391  There is an utter 
dearth of such considerations in the First and Seventh Circuits.  While these 
courts do purport to exhibit sympathy for SDP plaintiffs,392 their failure to 
act upon this apparent compassion by strictly applying exhaustion reveals 
the illusory nature of such empathy.  On the contrary, these circuits hold a 
largely negative view of SDP plaintiffs, characterizing them as litigants 
aiming to game the system by attempting to vindicate a takings claim 
without first satisfying Williamson County’s clear ripeness mandate.393 
 
 385. See supra notes 36–40, 67 and accompanying text (explaining that federal courts 
defer to local land use regulations, employing rational basis in determining their validity).  In 
fact, the Third Circuit is even more deferential to local governments than the Seventh. See 
United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392, 401 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(explaining that only conduct which shocks the conscience violates SDP in the land use 
context). 
 386. See, e.g., supra note 250 (reaching the merits of an SDP claim on a motion to 
dismiss). 
 387. See supra notes 10, 36, 40, 67 and accompanying text (noting that courts rarely 
invalidate land use regulations). 
 388. See supra notes 329–30 and accompanying text (explaining that SDP claims are 
difficult to prevail on); see also Anderson v. Chamberlain, 134 F. Supp. 2d 156, 159 n.5 (D. 
Mass. 2001) (remarking that SDP claims are unlikely to succeed). 
 389. See, e.g., supra note 250 and accompanying text (SDP claim stated). 
 390. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 391. See supra note 161 and accompanying text (indicating that hardship to the parties is 
an essential element of a prudential ripeness inquiry). 
 392. See supra notes 299–300 and accompanying text (noting troubling allegations). 
 393. See supra notes 291, 307, 316, 322–23 and accompanying text (noting that SDP 
claims are frequently characterized as takings in disguise). 
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Entirely absent from the First and Seventh Circuits’ ripeness analysis, 
however, is a consideration of the added costs, both temporal and financial, 
that applying exhaustion to SDP claims imposes on such plaintiffs.394  The 
onerous costs of relitigating SDP claims in state court could potentially 
prevent plaintiffs from refiling their claim after it is dismissed as unripe.  
This extreme hardship should therefore play a prominent role in these 
circuits’ ripeness analysis, ultimately leading them to find the case ripe.395 
2.  Exhaustion Stagnates Local Development 
In addition to wasting plaintiffs’ and state courts’ resources,396 
exhaustion also inefficiently stagnates local development by prolonging the 
duration of land use disputes.  When federal courts refuse to reach the 
merits of SDP claims, the question of whether regulations are valid, and 
thus how property can be used, remains uncertain.397  Consequently, in the 
interim, landowners often do not attempt to develop property in conformity 
with the challenged regulations, clinging to the hope that the regulations 
will be invalidated.398  Such hope is likely false, however.  While in rare 
instances zoning regulations may be invalidated, thereby allowing 
developers to exploit their property in defiance of land use laws, this is a 
rare instance indeed; developers will most likely be forced to comply with 
the challenged regulations.399  Forcing plaintiffs to refile SDP claims in 
state court only extends the time that land sits idly by, being put to no 
efficient use.  Exhaustion thus promotes the inefficient use of land in the 
interim period between the initiation and the resolution of an SDP 
challenge. 
To illustrate, take the aforementioned Downing case.400  There, the 
developer’s plans to develop his sixty-seven acre parcel were halted by the 
committee’s determination that his land was a historic site.401  In dismissing 
the developer’s SDP challenge as unripe, the underlying validity of the 
historic designation, and in turn whether the developer could develop his 
parcel as intensely as he had originally planned, remained uncertain.402  
Had the federal court addressed the SDP claim, the validity of the 
regulations would have been determined immediately, allowing the 
developer to devise alternate, compliant modes of development.  Instead, 
 
 394. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 395. See supra notes 161–62 and accompanying text (explaining that hardships to parties 
are relevant to ripeness, and should lead courts to find cases ripe if extreme). 
 396. See supra notes 377–82 and accompanying text. 
 397. See supra notes 143–44 and accompanying text (indicating that ripeness precludes 
federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over claims). 
 398. See supra notes 49–55 and accompanying text (explaining that SDP claims allege 
that the regulations are invalid). 
 399. See supra notes 10, 36–40, 63, 67 and accompanying text (noting that regulations are 
rarely invalidated). 
 400. See supra notes 311–16 and accompanying text. 
 401. See supra note 313 and accompanying text. 
 402. See supra note 316 and accompanying text (dismissing case as unripe, instead of 
reaching the merits). 
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the litigation continued to the First Circuit, where, once again, the court 
declined to reach the merits of the SDP claim, as the claim remained 
unripe.403  Despite two chances to uphold or strike down the committee’s 
decision, the federal courts passed the buck to the state court, which only 
prolonged the length of time the committee’s determinations remained in 
question.  In turn, the developer never implemented alternative plans, and 
his land remained undeveloped while the dispute dragged on. 
Notably, this inefficient side effect of exhaustion is absent in takings 
claims.  Takings plaintiffs do not challenge the validity of land use 
regulations, but instead aim to collect just compensation due to regulations 
interfering with the use of their land.404  Consequently, such plaintiffs are 
more likely to comply with unfavorable regulations even while their just 
compensation claims are unresolved, as the regulations themselves are not 
at issue.  As such, sending takings plaintiffs to state court does not stagnate 
development, because how the land can ultimately be used is not at issue 
there. 
C.  Exhaustion Provides an Unjust Procedural Advantage to Defendants 
The inequity of applying exhaustion to SDP claims is further evidenced 
by the unjust practical advantage it affords to SDP defendants.  Applying 
exhaustion to these claims leaves plaintiffs susceptible to crafty procedural 
moves by defendants, who can, without any fault of the plaintiffs, ‘unripen’ 
SDP claims. 
The federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441,405 allows defendants to 
remove a claim brought in state court to federal court.406  In circuits 
applying exhaustion to SDP claims, § 1441 transforms from a mere 
procedural tool into a mighty weapon, empowering defendants to remove 
ripe SDP claims filed in state court to federal court, rendering the claim 
unfit for review.407  This procedural maneuver exponentially increases the 
time and cost associated with SDP challenges, forcing plaintiffs to futilely 
litigate an unripe claim in federal court.  Nonetheless, the First and Seventh 
Circuits have opened the door to such conduct, and are frequently faced 
with such claims.408  The draconian nature of exhaustion is amplified in the 
removal context, as it demonstrates how plaintiffs, even when trying to 
comply with federal court mandates, are at the behest of defendants seeking 
to delay plaintiffs’ SDP challenges. 
 
 403. See supra notes 315–16 and accompanying text. 
 404. See supra notes 106–07 and accompanying text. 
 405. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2006). 
 406. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 407. E.g., 8679 Trout, L.L.C. v. N. Tahoe Pub. Utils. Dist., No. 2:10-CV-01569-MCE-
EFB, 2010 WL 3521952, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2010) (“Although the claim was ripe when 
it was originally filed in state court, it became unripe the moment that Defendants removed 
it.”). 
 408. E.g., CBS Outdoor, Inc. v. Vill. of Itasca, No. 08 C 4616, 2009 WL 3187250, at *2 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2009) (describing how the defendants removed the SDP claim, then 
pursued dismissal on ripeness grounds); Anderson v. Chamberlain, 134 F. Supp. 2d 156, 
159–60 (D. Mass. 2001) (same). 
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In cases where plaintiffs originally filed an SDP challenge in state court, 
it is only fair for the First and Seventh Circuits to reach the merits of the 
claim at hand.  In fact, the Ninth Circuit has already adopted this 
approach.409  Because courts have jurisdiction over SDP claims that satisfy 
finality,410 not reaching the merits of SDP claims removed to federal court 
by the defendant is simply unjust. 
CONCLUSION 
Ripeness is an essential criterion that federal courts use to ensure that 
they function properly and efficiently.  Federal courts are understandably 
concerned with docket control and want to avoid adjudicating petty disputes 
better suited for state court.  These concerns create a tension in SDP claims, 
however, as they are almost always local disputes that also implicate federal 
constitutional rights. 
Although land use disputes may not carry the same weight as other 
federal causes of action, they are still often a cognizable federal claim 
entitled to federal jurisdiction.  As such, it is inappropriate for federal courts 
to manipulate their ripeness analysis to avoid hearing these claims.  Due to 
this conflict of interest, the Supreme Court, like it did for regulatory 
takings, should announce a clear ripeness requirement for SDP claims, 
binding federal courts to an irrefutable standard of action.  By clarifying the 
ripeness standard, the Supreme Court can eliminate confusion over the 
appropriate venue for SDP claims, simplifying the litigation surrounding 
these often-heated land use disputes. 
 
 
 409. E.g., McClung v. City of Sumner, 548 F.3d 1219, 1223–24 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(assuming that a takings claim was ripe after municipal defendants removed the case to 
federal court). 
 410. See supra Parts III.A–B, IV.A. 
